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The Price of Prejudice 
The Japanese-American Relocation Center in Utah 
during W orld War II 
by 
LEONARD J. ARRINGTON 
THE JAPANESE IN AMERICA 
When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor December 7,1941, about 127,000 persons of Japanese descent were living in the United 
States, of whom more than 112,000 were on the Pacific Coast. These 
could be conveniently divided into three groups: the Issei or immi-
grants born in Japan; the Nisei or American-born, American-educated 
children of the Issei;' and the Kibei, who were born in America but re-
ceived some of their education in Japan. 
Permanently excluded from becoming American citizens by United 
States law, and seriously limited in their ability to acquire agricultural 
and residential property by alien land laws, the 40,000 Issei had never-
theless lived here for more than twenty-five years, had raised their 
children and achieved a recognized position in the retail and wholesale 
distribution of fruits and vegetables in California, and displayed every 
intention of remaining here with their children to live out their days in 
peace and comfort. 
The 70,000 Nisei, on the other hand, were predominantly teenagers 
and young adults, and in speech, dress, and manner, as well as in ideals 
and attitudes, were indistinguishable from other Americans of the same 
age. Twenty thousand of the Nisei had been to Japan at some time or 
other, mostly as youngsters for brief childhood visits or a little school-
ing. Less than 9,000, however, were Kibei who had received three or 
mOre years of education and "indoctrination" in Japan after the age of 
13. While most of these passionately and totally rejected Japanese 
?ivilization, a few consciously and defiantly identified themselves with 
It, leading some American authorities to believe that their primary al-
legiance Was not to America but to the emperor of Japan. 
. As the United States awoke to the devastating reality of the bomb-
mg of Pearl Harbor, a series of measures were taken which affected 
these persons of Japanese ancestry. Some 1,500 "enemy aliens" who 
Were thought to have connections with Japan were immediately 
rounded up and interned by the Department of Justice; their busi-
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I1esses were closed and their bank accounts "blocked." The remainder, 
both citizens and aliens, were required to register and carry identifi-
cation cards and to turn over to local police all "contraband"- cameras, 
radios, binoculars, and firearms. They were also "frozen" to within a 
five-mile radius of their homes and required to be in their homes 
between the hours of 8 p. m. and 6 a. m. 
In succeeding weeks, as Japan launched successful assaults against 
the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore, the American public became 
increasingly suspicious of persons of Japanese ancestry in the United 
States. Indeed, despite a traditional belief in tolerance and fair play, 
Americans - particularly Californians - had never regarded Japanese 
immigrants with special favor. Some individuals had long encour-
aged the view that the Japanese could not be assimilated, that they 
represented a racially undesirable element in American life, and that 
they imperiled the nation by their biological fertility. 
Of particular influence in the formulation of public attitudes were 
the widely publicized but completely unsubstantiated rumors of sabo-
tage and fifth-column activity in Hawaii in connection with the Pearl 
Harbor attack. Reports of enemy submarine activity off the coast of 
California added to the mounting sense of panic. Fearful of an invasion 
of the continent, and increasingly conscious of the dangers of resident 
Japanese sabotage, citizens on the West Coast demanded strong pre-
cautionary measures. 
That even the most conscientious Americans were vulnerable to 
the growing hysteria is illustrated by a column written from San Fran-
cisco by Walter Lippmann: 
. . . the Pacific Coast is in imminent danger oj a combined attack from 
within and from without .... It is [true] .•. that since the outbreak of 
the Japanese war there has been no important sabotage on the Pacific 
coast. From what we know about the fifth-column in Europe, this is not, 
as some have liked to think, a sign that there is nothing to be feared. It 
is a sign that the blow is well organized and that it is held back until it 
can be struck with maximum effect. . . . I am sure I understand fully 
and appreciate thoroughly the unwillingness of Washington to adopt a 
policy of mass evacuation and interment [sid] of all those who are tech-
nically enemy aliens. But I submit that Washington is not defining the 
problem on the Pacific coast correctly . ... The Pacific coast is officially 
a combat zone: some part of it may at any moment be a battlefield. No-
body's constitutional rights include the right to reside and do business on 
a battlefield. And nobody ought to be on a battlefield who has no good 
reason for being there.' 
On the day after this column appeared seven members of Congress 
from the Pacific Coast states addressed a letter to President Roosevelt 
recommending the "immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese 
lineage" and other "dangerous" persons from California, Oregon, Wash-
ington, and Alaska. At the same time, Lieutenant General John L. 
---'--"--Washington fails to cope with western fifth column," Salt Lake Tribune, Febnuuy Jlo. 
1942. 
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DeWitt, commanding general of the Western Defense Command in 
San Francisco, wrote an urgent letter to the War Department with sim-
ilar recommendations. 
THE MILITARY EXCLUSION ORDER 
At the height of the popular suspicion, distrust, and fear, on February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt acquiesced in signing the unprec-
edented Executive Order 9066, under which the Army was given blan-
ket power to deal with the enemy alien problem. General DeWitt 
then issued Public Proclamation No. 1 designating the entire western 
half of California, Oregon, and Washington as a "military area," and 
announced that all persons of Japanese ancestry would eventually be 
removed from that area "as a matter of military necessity." For the 
supervision of the evacuation the Wartime Civil Control Administration 
(WCCA) was established. 
What did General De\Vitt mean by military necessity? "Essen-
tially, military necessity," his report stated, "required only that the 
Japanese population be removed from the coastal area and dispersed to 
the interior, where the danger of action in concert during any attempt-
ed enemy raids along the coast, or in advance thereof as preparation 
for a full scale attack, would be eliminated." He then advanced as 
"reasons" for this unprecedented order that West Coast Japanese con-
stituted a "large, unassimilated, tightly-knit racial group bound to an 
enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom, and religion;" that 
the group had settled "along a frontier vulnerable to attack," and "virtu-
ally always" near vital shore installations and war plants; that there 
was evidence of suspicious signaling between unidentified persons on 
the West Coast and the Japanese forces at sea; and that there existed 
"no ready means" for determining the loyal from the disloyal. 
In the more rela.xed atmosphere of the postwar years, scholars 
who have studied the evidence of the times have almost universally 
concluded the precise opposite; namely, that the Japanese immigrants 
and their families had shown a remarkable willingness and ability to 
adapt themselves to American ways of life and habits of thought; that 
the basic loyalty of the overwhelming majority was to America; that 
the construction of the vital defense installations and facilities (airfields, ?ams, bridges, power lines, oil fields, and railways) had come after the 
~~igrants had settled on available farming land near West Coast 
CIties; and that there was and has been no reliable evidence of any 
communication between any of these residents and the Japanese forces 
at sea. As for the separation of the loyal from the disloyal, no one 
chuld pos~ibl: .have be~ieved.that it would have cost more to have .had 
t e FBI mdivIdually mvestIgate them and segregate the potentially 
-5-
disloyal than it cost the government to feed, clothe, house, and guard 
all 110,000 of them in detention camps for the duration of the war.' 
A more probable explanation of General DeWitt's action is indicat-
ed by his statement that "a Jap is a Jap .... It makes no difference 
whether he is an American citizen or not; he is still a Japanese. . . . 
The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many . . . have become 
'Americanized: the racial strains are undiluted. . . . Sabotage and 
espionage will make problems as long as he is allowed in this area." 
The General was so certain that a race of such enemy blood strain 
must commit sabotage that he stated, "The very fact that no sabotage 
has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that 
fouch action will be taken."· 
Americans have often been regarded as materialistic, but here is 
an instance in which they permitted military officers, influenced by 
anti-oriental pressure groups and unscrupulous competitors, to convert 
an industrious, productive group, with an annual agricultural and in-
dustrial production in excess of $250 million into "wards of the govern-
ment and guests of the treasury" at a time when the nation could ill 
afford to forego the skilled manpower they could supply.' 
But all this is reasoning after the event. At a time when the na-
tion was deeply absorbed with some of the gravest and most perilous 
problems in its history, the phrase "military necessity" was sufficient, 
not only to salve our consciences about action directed at a group solely 
on grounds of racial ancestry, but also to allay our deep-seated revul-
sion against the destruction of personal liberties and deprivation of 
constitutional rights on so broad a scale. The reaction of the ordinary 
citizen seems to have been that there had to be something seriously 
wrong with these people or the Army would not have ordered the 
blanket evacuation. 
Paradoxically, no action was taken to evacuate or intern more than 
a handful of Hawaiian Japanese, although the Japanese numbered a 
third more than those on the mainland and comprised 37 percent of the 
population of that vulnerable territory. Nor was any comparable move 
made against citizens or aliens of German and Italian ancestry. 
-:!"Jt is estimated that the cost of constructing the assembly centers and ten relocation 
('enters was approximately $70 million, with virtu air no salvage value. The estimated cost 
of maintaining the evacuees during the three years 0 detention was $150 million. The entire 
direct cost of the evacuation, not counting the loss to the evacuees or the loss to the country 
of the productive activities in which they would otherwise have engaged, was on the order 
of $350 million . 
• See the commentary in the d ecision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
District, August 26, 1949, which declared invalid the renunciations of American citizenship 
by residents of the Tule Lake Segregation Center; also "Belated justice," Christian Cent""" 
September 28, 1949, p. 1128. 
, The government's authority to detain alien evacuees was unassailable. but the deten-
tion of American citizens was more complex. In the opinion of the solicitor general, this 
could be done "to whatever extent is reasonably necessary to the national safety in wartime." 
With respect to a program which singled out Japanese-Americans for de tention the solicitor 
wrote that it was legal provided the discrimination can be shown to be related to a genuine 
war need and does not, under the guise of national defense, discriminate for a purpose un-
related to the national war effort. 
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EVACUATION 
At first the evacuation was voluntary; Nisei and Kibei were instructed to move out of strategic areas on their own. Almost five thou-
sand did move, principally to Utah and Colorado, but the growing sus-
picion and the general public antagonism in the interior presented 
many difficulties. General DeWitt and his staff made no effort to pre-
pare the interior states for the voluntary migration which he had en-
couraged, or to explain why people of Japanese descent were regarded 
as a hazard in the coastal zone but not in the interior. As a conse-
quence, the Nisei who responded to the General's urging ran into all 
kinds of trouble. Some were turned back by Arizona border guards; 
others were met by armed posses in Nevada; still others were held "on 
suspicion" by panicky local peace officers. Many were greeted by 
"No Japs wanted" signs or were threatened by nuclei of angry citizens. 
The reaction in Utah, where more than 2,000 persons of Japanese 
ancestry lived, and to which another 1,500 refugees moved during this 
period of voluntary evacuation, was not as hysterical as that of her 
neighboring states; but even here the sentiment was such as to discour-
age settlement." Governor Herbert B. Maw, for example, publicly ex-
pressed his opposition to their settlement in the Wasatch Front area . 
"If the federal officials think they are dangerous on the coast," he said, 
"they would be here." He convened a meeting of county representa-
tives to determine those which would welcome the evacuees and found 
that all but two were opposed to receiving them. Some of the confer-
ees spoke of the danger of sabotage; others were fearful that the J ap-
anese would get control of Utah's already limited acreage of good farm 
land. One outspoken commissioner minced no words in saying that 
his county wanted no Japanese, and intimated that the people there 
were considering adopting their own means of keeping them out. '1f 
they are thrust on us we want them in concentration camps," he de-
clared. Resolutions protesting the resettlement of Japanese in the Salt 
Lake area "unless properly supervised" were subsequently adopted by 
units of the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and similar 
patriotic groups. Alien evacuation from the coast, the resolutions de-
clared, "had already created a serious menace to the welfare of the 
people of the state of Utah." 
Faced with almost universal expressions of antagonism in the in-
terior, the vast majority of Pacific Coast Japanese-Americans simply 
~e largest number settled in a " Japanese town" in Salt Lake City called "Nihonmachi." ~e of the fiTst groups to move to Utah was composed of 130 Nisei from the Oakland area 
Fisier the leadership of produce d ealer Fred 'vVada. They leased the 4,000-8cre George A . 
liver. ranch in Keetley, Wasatch County, and raised vegetables and other produce. They 
us ad lD a large two-story apartment buiJding originally erected for miners, and more recently 
anel br summer tourists. Intensely patriotic, they adopted the motto, " Go East, young man, 
AnotlalSe food for freedom," and erected "Food for Freedom" billboards along the highway. 
Com ler group of migrants to Utah worked on a cooperative basis for the Chipman Livestock 
pany of Nounan, Idaho. 
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stayed put. On March 27, 1942, voluntary evacuation was halted and 
the anny took the unprecedented step of activating a program of com-
pulsory evacuation. 
The Japanese response to this order requiring the uprooting of 
over a tenth of a million people was unbelievably restrained, and there 
was no serious protest or resistance. While many were stunned and 
bewildered by the arbitrary action, the overwhelming majority fol-
lowed the principle of shikataganai - "realistic resignation." The 
Nisei, in particular, chose to regard the decision as one of the vagaries 
of American democracy. Realizing that their future status in the 
United States depended on their response in this critical hour, they re-
solved to prove their worth as American citizens beyond all possibility 
of reasonable doubt. The clearest and most influential expression of 
the dominant attitude was given in February 1942 by Mike Masaoka, 
a former Salt Laker, who was secretary of the national J apanese-Amer-
ican Citizens League: 
If, in the judgment of military and federal authorities, evacuation of 
Japanese residents from the west coast is a primary step toward assuring 
the safety of this Nation, we will have no hesitation in complying with the 
necessities implicit in that judgment. But, if, on the other hand, such 
evacuation is primarily a measure whose surface urgency cloaks the desires 
of political and other pressure groups who want us to leave merely from 
motives of self interest, we feel we have every right to protest and to de-
mand equitable judgment on our merits as American citizens.' 
One of the unfortunate effects of the expulsion order was the in-
adequate protection of evacuee property rights. It is estimated that 
the families affected by the evacuation order had equities in more than 
$200 million in property of various kinds. This included about 250,000 
acres of lush farming land, some 20,000 automobiles, several thousand 
businesses, and of course homes, furniture, art works, bank accounts, 
and other forms of property built up at great sacrifice over a period of 
many years. By and large, the evacuees were expected to dispose of 
this property quickly and individually. Each person was pennitted to 
take with him only what he could carry in his hands, and the govern-
ment agreed to provide for the storage of property only at the risk of 
the owner: 
Before the evacuation, many were victimized by the unscrupulous. 
Junk and second hand 'dealers often followed on the heels of notifying 
officers, stating that the government intended to seize Japanese house-
hold belongings. Furnishings valued at hundreds of dollars were pur-
chased for four and five dollars. Real estate men, threatening to re-
port Japanese registrants to the FBI if they refused to sell, purchased 
----.-:National Defense Migration. Fourth interim Report of the Select Committee ' . . • • 
77th Congress, 2d Session, House Report 2124, Washington, 1942. 
1 In 1948 a remorseful Congress decided that it had a moral obligation to reimburse the 
evacuees for some of their property losses. Within the following ten years, more tIlan 26,000 
claims were settled, totalling more than $36 million - about one-third the value of the lost 
property. 
-8-
homes and farms for a fraction of their true value. Ultimately, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco was assigned the responsibility 
of storing personal property, the Office of Alien Property Custodian 
managed their businesses, and the Farm Security Administration super-
vised the management and disposal of their farms. However, these 
measures did not counteract initial losses and were inadequate to pre-
vent further losses during the period of exile. By the end of the war, 
the number of Japanese-owned or Japanese-leased farms had dropped 
from 7,000 to 2,000, and total income and property losses of all Ameri-
can-Japanese attributed to the evacuation is estimated at $350 million. 
THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY 
Upon the issuance of the evacuation order on March 27, 1942, the military began the construction of fifteen "assembly centers" at 
racetracks, fairgrounds, and livestock exhibition halls near the prin-
cipal settlement~. Between March and June 1942, all citizens and 
aliens of Japanese descent were transferred to hastily-built barracks 
at these centers and surrounded by Caucasian military police and 
barbed wire fences. 
Life at these centers was full of the characteristic irritations of 
military camp life: frequent roll calls, wholesale vaccinations, censor-
ship of mail, lack of privacy, and long lines awaiting service in mess 
halls, movies, laundry, post office, and latrines. There were also spe-
cial restrictions on the use of the Japanese language, and on visitors, 
and periodic inspection of quarters for such "contraband" as saws, 
safety razors, radios, liquor, cameras, Japanese phonograph records and 
literature (including Bibles and other religious works), and firearms. 
Nevertheless, the tension was relieved by such activities as the repair 
and landscaping of quarters, planting of victory gardens, and an exten-
sive WCCA recreation program. There were daytime and evening 
classes, craft and hobby shows, carnivals and concerts, talent shows and 
dances. 
For permanent supervision of the evacuees, President Roosevelt, 
in an Executive Order dated March 18, 1942, had established the civil-
ian-controlled War Relocation Authority (WRA), with the responsibil-
ity of making arrangements to feed the residents, provide the sick with 
medical care, educate the children, and put the adults to work on use-
ful projects. Anxious to be relieved of the responsibility of caring for 
the evacuees, the WCCA transferred the 110,000 residents of the as-
sembly centers, during the summer and fall of 1942, to ten newly-con-
structed barracks cities, known as "relocation centers," in far-removed 
places in seven states. These were administered by vVRA. 
Milton Eisenhower, coordinator of land use programs in the De-
partment of Agriculture and brother of the General, was selected to 
-9-
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WAR RELOCATION CENTERS FOR JAPANESE·AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR n 
(Listed in order of their establishment) 
PEAK RESIDENT 
NAME OF CENTER LOCATION OPENING DATE CLOSING DATE POPULATION 
Manzanar Manzanar, Inyo County, California March 21, 1942 November 21, 1945 10,046 
Colorado River Poston, Yuma County, Arizona May 8,1942 November 28, 1945 17,814 
Tule Lake Newell, Modoc County, California May 27,1942 March 20, 1946 18,789 
Gila River Rivers, Pinal County, Arizona July 20, 1942 November 10, 1945 13,348 
Minidoka Hunt, Jerome County, Idaho August 10, 1942 October 28, 1945 9,397 
Heart Mountain Heart Mountain, Park County, Wyoming August 12, 1942 November 10, 1945 10,767 
Granada Amache, Prowers County, Colorado August 27, 1942 October 15, 1945 7,318 
Central Utah Topaz, Millard County, Utah September 11, 1942 . October 31, 1945 8,130 
Rohwer McGehee, Desha County, Arkansas September 18, 1942 November 30, 1945 8,475 
Jerome Denson, Drew and Chicot Counties, Arkansas October 6, 1942 June 30, 1944 8,497 
Source: United States Department of Interior, WRA: A story at human conservation, Washington, D.C., 1946, p. 197 et passim. 
The War Relocation Authority also maintained, during the first four months of 1943, a temporary isolation center near Moab, Utah, 
and between April and October, 1943, the Leupp Isolation Center, Winslow, Arizona. From March 1944 to 1946 it also operated the 
ahelter for 1,000 European war refugees at Fort Ontario, Oswego, New York. 
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be the first director of WRA. Dr. Eisenhower soon moved on to 
another assignment and was succeeded, on June 17, 1942, by Dillon 
S. Myer, assistant administrator of the Agricultural Conservation and 
Adjustment Administration, who remained in charge of the program 
from that time until its conclusion. Nearly all of the central and field 
staff of WRA came from the Department of Agriculture. 
The ten barracks camps to which Japanese-Americans were taken 
by the WCCA were widely scattered. Two were chosen by military 
authorities in February and March 1942, and turned over to WRA in 
June. One of these, Manzanar, was located in the Owens Valley of 
east-central California on land controlled by the City of Los Angeles 
as protection for its municipal water supply. The other, Colorado 
River, was on 72,000 acres of unused Indian reservation lands in the 
extreme western part of Arizona. 
Of the remaining eight chosen by WRA, three were on undevel-
oped portions of federal reclamation projects: Tule Lake in the Klam-
ath Falls basin of extreme northern California, Minidoka in the Good-
ing Reclamation Project of south-central Idaho, and Heart Mountain in 
the reclamation project of the same name in northwestern Wyoming. 
Two (Rohwer and Jerome) were located on lands controlled by the 
Farm Security Administration and purchased originally for the reha-
bilitation of low-income farm families; one (Gila River) was on sage-
brush Indian reservation lands; the Granada center in southeastern 
Colorado was on privately-owned land purchased for WRA by the 
Army; and the Central Utah center consisted of a mixture of public 
domain land, a number of tracts which had reverted to the county 
during the 'thirties for nonpayment of taxes, and several privately-
owned parcels, including some which had been acquired by a New 
York syndicate during the Depression for failure to pay interest." 
In the selection of sites, four considerations were paramount: 
1. WRA, interested in a large-scale work program, wanted sites 
which offered possibilities for extensive agricultural development or for 
year-round employment opportunities of other types. 
2. The Army, concerned with national security and deeply dis-
trustful of the evacuated people, insisted that all sites be located on 
"wide open" terrain from which escape would be difficult, and "at a safe 
distance" from strategic installations. The Army also required that all 
centers be planned for an evacuee population of at least 5,000, so as to 
minimize the manpower required to guard them. 
3. For fiscal reasons, it was desirable to locate the centers on lands 
which were in federal ownership, or available for federal purchase, so 
tthhat improvements made at federal expense would not be used to increase 
e value of private property. 
--.-
8840 There were 19,800 ncres in the Utah project, of which 1.400 acres were public dom ain, 
ment were owned by Millard County, and 9,560 acres were owned privately. The govern-
cam paId $1.00 p er acre for the Millard County land. Although the site of the Central Utah indi~ was 110t chosen until tl:c latter part of June 1942, a report in the Salt Lake Tribune 
early utes i hat agents of the VlTar and Justice D epartments investir,ated possible locations as 
as ebmary 6, 1942, well before the exclusion order was issued. 
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4. The centers had to be located within a reasonable distance of a 
railhead, with access to a dependable and economical supply of water 
and electric power. 
All of the sites were chosen after appropriate negotiations with 
state and local officials and acquired by the United States Corps of 
Engineers for WRA. 
TOPAZ: "JEWEL OF THE DESERT" 
The Central Utah Relocation Center was located in the vicinity of Abraham, Millard County, on a bed of the ancient Lake Bonneville 
- a lake formed in Pleistocene times and connected with Great Salt 
Lake. On the older maps it was called "Sevier Desert," but the Pai-
utes, who had inhabited it for many centuries, called it "Pahvant," 
meaning "abundance of water." Apparently, before the "white" men 
diverted the water of the Sevier River for irrigation, there was plenty 
of water in the stream and many lakes spread over the big greasewood 
flat. 
The first "white" persons to visit the bleak and windy plain, 
Fathers Dominguez and Escalante in 1776, called the area "Valle So-
lado," or Valley of Salt. This was an apt designation, for even today 
the Great Pahvant Valley is often referred to as the "Big Alkali Flat." 
During the intensive search for settlement sites after the Utah War of 
1857-1858, a "company" of Mormon pioneers constructed a canal and 
settled part of the valley, but later abandoned it. Another group re-
turned in the 1870's and 1880's, and even formed a corporation to settle 
the area later selected for the relocation site. But repeated irrigation 
"turned the soil to alkali," cost-price relationships became unfavorable, 
and most of the area was once again abandoned to its natural cover of 
greasewood and saltgrass. The surrounding area was so desolate in 
aspect that many visitors remarked that the site must have been chosen 
to prevent the inhabitants from maintaining contact with the outer 
world. 
The name given to Utah's remote new barbed-wire city came from 
Topaz Mountain, nine miles northwest of the center. The desert town 
was sixteen miles northwest of the Union Pacific railhead town of Delta 
(population 1,500), and about 140 miles southwest of Salt Lake City. 
Surrounded on all four sides by mountains, the barren valley in which 
it was located is 4,600 feet above sea level. The climate ranges from a 
boiling 106 degrees in summer to a frigid 30 degrees below zero in win-
ter. The rainfall averages between 7 and 8 inches per year. One 
characteristic of the area is the wind, which keeps up a seldom inter-
rupted whirl of dust. Another is the nonabsorbent soil which, after 
a rain, is a gummy muck, ideal as a breeding ground for mosquitoes. 
-12-
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Constructed between July 1942 and January 1943 by a California 
firm (Daley Brothers) under a contract let by the Salt Lake District of 
the Mountain Division of the United States Corps of Engineers, the 
center cost $3,929,000. More than 800 men labored on the project 
building row after row of low, black barracks of frame and tar paper 
ccnstruction. An estimated $1 million was subsequently spent by 
WRA for additional structures. 
While the entire project covered 19,800 acres, the "city" - de-
signed to house 9,000 persons - was a mile square, and was divided 
into areas for evacuee residents, administrative personnel, and military 
police. The evacuee area consisted of forty-two checkerboard blocks, 
of which thirty-four were living quarters or residential blocks. Each 
block was uniformly constructed to house and service 250 to 300 per-
sons, and had twelve single-story resident barracks buildings, a central 
mess or dining hall, a recreation hall, a combination washroom-toilet-
laundry building, outdoor clotheslines, and an office for the block man-
ager. Each barrack was divided into six single rooms, ranging from 
16 by 20 feet to' 20 by 25 feet in size. Each room was "home for the 
duration" for a family with several children or for four or five unrelat-
ed individuals. During the early weeks when the housing was still 
uncompleted the rooms often held two families or up to eight bach-
elors. To many Japanese, the most objectionable aspect of the entire 
arrangement was the denial of individual and family privacy. 
From Army stores WRA furnished pot-bellied stoves, cots, sacks 
or mattress covers, and blankets, but there was seldom enough bedding. 
The evacuees were required to make their own partitions, chairs, 
benches, tables, shelves, closets, storage chests, 'and other furniture. 
This was done by "borrowing" the 400,000 board feet of scrap lumber 
left over from the construction. Additional wood was obtained from 
scrap lumber of the newly-cons~cted Remington Arms plant in Salt 
Lake City. There Were no washing, bathing, or toilet facilities in the 
barracks; a central building in each block had to be used for these pur-
poses. Even so, there were only four bathtubs for all the women on 
each block, and the same number of showers for the men; and even 
these were lacking for several weeks. All meals were taken in the cen-
tral dining hall. 
In the center of the residential area were a community auditorium, 
gymnasium, canteens, schools, libraries, churches, post office, and fire 
station. A number of athletic fields were south of the city, and there 
Was also a fifteen-acre community garden plot. An evacuee cemetery 
Was located southeast of the city but was never used; all of the 144 
persons who died at Topaz during the three-year period were sent to 
~alt Lake City and their ashes held for burial until the return to the 
an Francisco Bay region after the war. 
-13-
The administrative area consisted of eight blocks of one-story of-
fice buildings, barracks apartments, dormitories with modem conven-
iences, and a recreation center. In this area was also located a hospital, 
and a number of maintenance and construction sheds. Approximately 
200 Caucasians supervised and staffed the various administrative divi-
sions, half of them from nearby towns. The total cost of operating the 
center was approximately $5 million per year, of which $1.75 million 
was for personal services, $2.5 million for supplies and materials, and 
$1 million for additional construction, utilities, and clothing grants. 
In one comer of the square, behind a barbed-wire fence, was a 
twenty-acre area with the barracks and headquarters of the Military 
Police, about a hundred of whom arrived just ahead of the first detach-
ment of evacuees. During most of the history of the center there were 
from three to five officers and from 85 to 150 men. Guard houses were 
built at each entrance to the city, and the military police checked the 
. papers and credentials of every-person going and coming. Both the 
city and the entire project area were surrounded by tall, strong barbed-
wire fences, with watchtower guard houses equipped with searchlights 
every quarter of a mile manned by patrols of armed guards. 
All told, there were 623 buildings, all of uniformly somber aspect 
except the hospital and administrative buildings, which were painted 
white. Water for the project came from three deep-drilled wells at 
the east side of the area which were capable of supplying 1,300,000 
gallons daily. The water was stored in four elevated redwood water 
tanks - said to constitute the largest wooden water tank in the world 
-.,. with a total capacity of 500,000 gallons. All reports indicate that 
the water was almost undrinkable. 
All of the housing and administrative areas, civic center, and ath-
letic fields were completed and landscaped by the summer of 1943; 
i. e., nine months after the residents had arrived. From the Forestry 
Department of Utah State Agricultural College 75 large trees and 7,500 
small trees, principally Siberian elms, Utah juniper, Russian olives, 
and black locusts, were obtained to beautify the center. There were 
also 10,000 cuttings of tamarisk shrubs, willows, and wild currants. 
Nearly all the trees and shrubbery died; the alkaline soil, heat, and 
wind foiled efforts to get grass and flowers to grow. 
At the time of occupancy Topaz was only two-thirds completed. 
There were drafty buildings, crowded barracks, and open trenches, and 
many suffered until the housing and hospital construction crews could 
finish their work. In the first months of blowing dust and rain, when 
the houses had neither ceilings nor inside walls, the people had to sleep 
and work with faces covered by towels. Several hundred 
evacuees assisted in the weather proofing of the buildings. 
the work was held up by shortages of tools and equipment. 
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ARRIVAL OF EVACUEES 
The first contingent of evacuees arrived in Topaz on September 11, 1942, and consisted of 214 Nisei volunteer workers. They were 
immediately assigned to the hospital, kitchen, and transportation crews 
to prepare for the main influx the following week. The first train load 
of "regular" evacuees, with 502 aboard, arrived September 16, in a suf-
focating cloud of dust which hovered over the camp all day. There-
after, trainloads of 500 or more arrived almost daily until October 15, 
when the last group arrived. Each busload of new arrivals was greet-
ed by an improvised drum and bugle corps. 
All told, 8,255 persons were transferred from WCCA custody to 
the Central Utah camp in the fall of 1942. These included 7,673 from 
the Tanforan Assembly Center, San Bruno, California, and 577 from the 
Santa Anita Center in southern California. With a handful of excep-
tions, all of the Topaz exiles were from areas fronting on the San Fran-
cisco Bay. Sixty-five percent of the population had been born in the 
United States, which is a higher proportion than in many Utah cities 
during the nineteenth century. For three years these imported resi-
dents comprised the fifth most populous city in Utah. 
The director of the Topaz center was Charles F. Ernst, a native of 
Boston and graduate of Harvard, who had been director of Washing-
ton State's program of unemployment relief from 1933 to 1941. He 
was assistant to the vice chairman of the American Red Cross in · San 
Francisco immediately before the Topaz assignment. He resigned the 
Topaz appointment in June 1944 to go with the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration and was replaced by Luther T. 
Hoffman, assistant chief of the WRA relocation division in Washington, 
who served until the closing of the camp in October 1945. Many 
Utahans who have since attained prominence - too many to name 
here - were among those assisting in the administration. 
Among the evacuee residents were many interesting and distin-
guished people. They included Frank Takeuchi, one of the world's 
?Teat Judo artists and a major attraction in vaudeville; Kantaishi Nish-
l~ura, colorful leader of Utah mining unions during World War I; 
NIck Iyoya, gentleman bartender and darling of the Bay Region elite, 
~ho had mixed drinks and exchanged conversation with greats of ~e continents; Joseph Ito, carnival man and leading concessionaire of 
e Barnum and Bailey circus; Toshio Asaeda, photographer, icthy-
o!ogist, ornithologist, botanist, and adventurer, who had spent a life-
~e sketching and photographing the flora and fauna of the South 
Neas; Yonezo Kamishita, whose exciting career with the United States 
S avy and Coast Guard had been the subject of several articles in the 
.unday supplements; and Chiura Obata, professor of art at the Univer-
SIty of California, whose landscapes had delighted a whole generation 
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of art lovers. There was the gardener who laid out the grounds of the 
Hollywood homes of Shirley Temple and Charles Boyer, and owner of 
the Golden Gate Tea Gardens, the chief surgeon of the Los Angeles 
County Hospital, and the director of a Protestant missionary crusade. 
Most difficult to forget, perhaps, was Mine' Okubo. At the out-
break of the war in Europe she had won the University of California's 
highest art honor - a travelling scholarship to Europe. She had 
hiked and bicycled through a dozen nations before advancing German 
panzers isolated her in Hungary. Escaping to Switzerland, she worked 
on a farm until she could borrow enough money to return to the United 
States, and reached California in time to assist Diego Rivera with 
murals for the Golden Gate International Exposition on Treasure Is-
land. Her first one-man show was held at the San Francisco Museum 
of Art just before the evacuation. In Topaz she was staff illustrator 
for the little homespun magazine, Trek, and made more than a thou-
sand black-and-white drawings of life in Topaz from which she chose 
the illustrations for her engaging personal documentary, Citizen 13660. 
The activities of the Topazans during the first few weeks were 
much like those of the Mormon pioneers who preceded them. The 
first evening after the advance group and director arrived, there was 
a mass meeting of residents and administrative personnel in the com-
munity hall. In giving the invocation, the Reverend Taro Goto dedi-
cated the center "to the glory of almighty God and to the uplifting of 
His Kingdom." Thereafter, meetings were held once or twice a day 
to arrange work schedules and work out solutions to the many prob-
lems. Artists, small businessmen, majordomos, schoolboys, and gar-
deners were all engaged in digging ditches, clearing the land of gre~e­
wood, constructing sheds, planting shrubs, and making furniture for the 
schools. There were optimism, resourcefulness, good 
and ambitious plans for the future. "We will survive," said t'r<>te;ssor. 
Obata, "if we forget the sands at our feet and look to the 
for inspiration." Within a week Topaz had established a CO()Pe:rative. 
general store, a mimeographed newspaper, and reported its first 
death, appendectomy, dance, religiOUS service, and election. It is 
from all the records that the evacuees, as with early Mormon "UJlU .... __ 
zers, were determined to build a city in this lonely desert region 
America would be proud of. 
CONFINEMENT VS. RESETTLEMENT 
What was perhaps the most important single decision made by during the war was reached even before the Topaz center 
established. It concerned the degree to which the evacuees would 
permitted freedom of movement outside the camps. On the one 
WRA was understandably reluctant to keep them all confined and 
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der heavy guard; on the other hand, public opinion and the military 
would not permit it to open the gates without strict supervision and 
control of the evacuees in its charge. 
The latter point of view was underscored by the governing offi-
cials of the Western States at an exploratory conference held by WRA 
on April 7, 1942, in Salt Lake City. The WRA director expressed to 
the conference his deep concern about the civil liberties of the evacuees 
,md the problem of making effective use of the manpower they repre-
sented, and then outlined WRA's plans for the establishment of hun-
dreds of small work camps over the country, with evacuee participation 
in local and national programs of public works and agricultural and in-
dustrial production. The vast majority of state officials, however, in-
sisted on rigorous confinement in some kind of concentration camp, 
with workers farmed out, if at all, under armed guards. Control over 
evacuees, they felt, should be on the same basis as that of Japanese 
citizens and aliens still remaining on the Coast. Almost unanimously, 
they demanded complete assurance that the internees would be remov-
ed from their states at the end of the war." 
In the meantime, however, other pressures were forcing a reap-
praisal. There was considerable support for a program which would 
allow Nisei students at coastal universities to transfer to inland colleges 
without interruption of their schooling; and, with foreign sources of 
sugar cut off and a shortage of rural manpower 'at home, sugar beet 
companies pressed for the use of the highly-skilled Japanese labor. 
Remembering the unhappy experience of some of the voluntary evac-
uees, WCCA and WRA bravely softened the absolute prohibition of 
movement from the assembly centers by permitting the relocation of 
a limited number of students and by granting permission to sugar com-
panies to recruit evacuee labor. 
About 75 Nisei students were transferred in the spring of 1942 
from California universities to universities in the interior. Even this 
~as not simple to arrange; many colleges and universities were unwill-
Ing to accept Nisei evacuees who wanted to enroll. A minute from the 
meeting of the Board of Trustees in March 1942 indicates that Utah 
State Agricultural College was one of those that turned down such ap-
~lications. With one of the largest training centers in Western Amer-
Ica, giving elementary and advanced classes in radio technology to a 
---.- -
aliens ~n ~IrJch 1943 the Utah Legislature passed by overwhelming majority a bill barring pro~e~glble for United States citizensbip (e.g., Japanese) from purchasing or leasing real 
lands i'b the state. Designed to prevent Topaz evacuees from competing for Utah farm 
that ian ecoming permanent residents, the bill was vetoed by Governor Maw on the grounds 
'Iate t 'd0uld prevent such other aliens as ChinE'se and Filipinos from acquiring land in the 
pres; an would also deprive Utah farmers of the help of the alien evacuees at Topaz. The 
facto!ie to veto the bill, it was said, came from representatives of sugar companies, canning 
author':''' 'POultry producers, and other processors in the state who had learned that national 
law 't~ w?uld refuse to allow alien Japanese to work outside the center if the Act became an~e fa er In the same month a milder law was passed and signed which prohibited Jap-
farmers r~m CWDing or making long-tenn lE'ases of lands in Uta4, but specifically permitted 
Period t employ them for a cash fee or share of the crop, or to lease land to them for a 
o One year. The Act was repealed in 1947 without a dissenting vote. 
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large number of naval trainees, officials felt there was no place for the 
Nisei. Moreover, "if anything should happen to any of the college 
buildings or the large amount of equipment used in the war training," 
said President Elmer G. Peterson, "it would be easy to blame the Jap-
anese."'· In the late stages of the war, however, both Utah State Ag-
ricultural College and the University of Utah accepted Nisei students. 
About 10,000 evacuees left t4e assembly and relocation centers in 
]942 to do seasonal agricultural work, principally in Utah, Idaho, and 
Colorado. Employers were required to pay prevailing wages, provide 
adequate living quarters at no expense to the evacuee, provide trans-
portation from the center to the place of employment and back, and 
give assurance that employment of the evacuees would not result in 
displacement of local labor. State and local officials were required 
to give evidence that law and order would be maintained. The re-
cruited workers were forbidden to leave the designated area without 
specific permission from WRA. Many of them had occasional un-
pleasant experiences because of the widespread public misapprehen-
sions about their status, but none reported suffering physical harm. 
It was estimated that they saved enough beets to make nearly 300 mil-
lion pounds of sugar. 
The smooth and successful movement into the beet fields, the ob-
vious waste of manpower in the centers, and the danger in having thou-
sands of American youngsters grow up in an environment that was a 
fundamental negation of American democracy, led WRA to announce, 
even before the majority of the evacuees had been moved into the 
WRA centers, that one of the major policies of WRA would be reloca-
tion outside the centers.u The program of "outside" employment 
plied to Issei and Nisei alike, and included short-term leave, "v""VUa& 
agricultural leave, student relocation, and "indefinite furlough" 
normal residence in any community outside the exclusion zone. 
Since Utah was one of the agricultural states with a labor 
it is not surprising to find that state officials and farmers made ""<l 'rht'-. 
ularly fervent appeals for evacuee workmen. At the time when the 
center was opened, Governor Maw proposed that all able-bodied 
uees be conscripted into the army and assigned to farm work at ... ~ ... __ ~ 
salaries. WRA would not accede to this, of course, but in late 
tember 1942 it did permit the Amalgamated, Utah-Idaho, and 
,. Utah State Agricultural College was one of thirteen colleges in the Western 
States - and the only one in Utah - which was classified hy the Defense D e]p8l1tment 
"important to the war effort." In August 1944 the Board of Trustees passed a 
effect that Japanese students would he accepted for the coming year, but because 
full program for Army and Navy men, and perhaps for other reasons, few were ad~:=:J 
On one occasion, Governor Maw also advised the University of Utah not to admit J 
students. 
U The essential abnormality of life in the evacuee community, and the anomaly of 
large segment of America's population being kept in forced confinement in the midst of 
war dedicated to the preservation of democratic principles, is perhaps best illustrated in 
Topaz story of a small boy who said to his parents: "I don't like it here. When are 
going back to America?" Taro Katayama, "Beyond the gate," Trek, February 1943, p. 2. 
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County sugar companies to recruit some 230 laborers for work in north-
ern Utah and southern Idaho. Approximately 300 others were em-
ployed during the same fall in apple, carrot, and potato picking, in 
turkey feather plucking, and in other work of like character. Some 
130 Topaz residents were engaged to do construction work and domes-
tic and industrial labor, and a few were called to teach in the Army 
Language School at Boulder, Colorado. 
After the return of the seasonal workers in January 1943, a ques-
tionnaire was circulated among them asking what kind of a reception 
they found in the communities and on the farms in Utah and southern 
1 Idaho. Approximately 85 percent indicated they had a "good" - as 
1 compared with 12 percent "fair" and 3 percent "poor" - reception. 
I Since Topazans were preponderantly urban and industrial in origin and 
background, their chief complaint was that there were not more divers-
t ified economic opportunities. 
REGISTRATION AND SEGREGATION 
W ithin the Utah center the vast majority of evacuees were either younger Nisei enthusiastically building a model city or older 
Issei · exhibiting the patient stoicism and silent resignation char-
acteristic of their philosophy. A few of both groups were per-
sistent and chronic troublemakers. Where these could be spotted 
they were picked up by the internal security police and sent to an 
abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps camp near Moab, Utah, which 
was set up in January 1943 as a temporary "isolation center" for all 
the camps. A more permanent detention center was later established 
at an unoccupied Indian boarding school near Leupp, Arizona, and 
the malcontents were transferred from Moab to Leupp in late April 
1943. Topaz sent eleven incorrigibles, principally Kibei, to Leupp 
in July 1943, all of whom had testified and signed statements that they 
were not only disloyal to the United States, but would also commit 
sabotage if opportunity presented. Small contingents of "agitators" 
were sent to the Leupp center until late in 1943, when it was closed 
and its remaining inmates moved to the Tule Lake Segregation Center. 
Perhaps the gravest emotional test for the residents of Topaz was 
the Army's loyalty registration and recruitment program of February 
1943. All evacuees over the age of 17 were asked to register and 
rlespond to a series of questions. The key question - the so-called 
oyalty question - was as follows: 
Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of 
America and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japan-
ese Emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization? 
~ince this country had denied them citizenship, the Issei felt that by 
orswearing allegiance to Japan they would become people without 
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a country -:- without a protecting power. Even the Nisei, resenting the 
implication that their loyalty was in doubt, felt that the question was 
unfair, and in Topaz almost a fifth of all male registrants answered 
in the negative. Agreeing that there was justice in the complaint 
against the wording, WRA induced the Army to change it to: 
Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to 
take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of 
the United States? 
This change was too late to affect the unfavorable impression 
which the original wording had produced, however, and many refused 
to answer. There were intense feelings on the issue and emotions 
were stirred to unprecedented levels. Several pro-administration 
leaders were assaulted or received threatening letters, and jars of 
odorous material were thrown through the apartment windows of 
eight families. 
Both Nisei and Kibei were also concerned with Question 27: "Are 
you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on com-
bat duty, wherever ordered?" The Nisei responded at first with a 
resolution to the Secretary of War suggesting that they would be glad 
to volunteer for Army service if their civil rights were restored. The 
War Department's reply to this manifestly reasonable request was as 
follows: 
It is only by mutual confidence and cooperation that the loyal Jap-
anese-Americans can be restored to their civil rights. The present pro-
gram is not complete rehabilitation but is the first step in that direction. 
The United States government has evidenced its faith in the loyal 
Japanese-Americans by giving them the opportunity to serve their 
country. This is their opportunity to demonstrate to the American people 
that they have faith in America. 
When the objectives of the program became clearly understood, 
the strong resistance to registration collapsed. Some 5,364 Topaz 
registrants gave a direct or qualified "yes" answer to the loyalty ques-
tion, and there were 790 direct or qualified "no" answers. About one-
third of the "no" votes were later reversed. However, in consequence 
of the turbulent registration episode there was a suprisingly large 
number of repatriation and expatriation requests. Soon after the reg-
istration these totaled 447, of which 201 were from draft-age male 
citizens (159 Kibei and 42 Nisei) and only 84 from aliens. By Sep-
tember, when the segregation program was nearly complete, such 
requests had nearly doubled. Only 36 of these actually left Topaz to 
board an exchange ship for Japan. 
Just before the mass registration, the War Department had an-
nounced that evacuee volunteers from all the centers would be 
accepted for a Japanese-American combat team." Although many 
'" Fully 5,000 Nisei were in uniform at the time, having been drafted prior to Pead 
Harbor. After that, Selective Service refused to accept them. 
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Nisei regarded the War Department's action as an opportunity to 
demonstrate their loyalty to the land of their birth, the registration 
tended to crystallize the opposition to volunteering. The Topazans 
who opposed it emphasized the anomaly of asking for volunteers from 
a group the Army had confined in a relocation center, the injustice 
of a segregated unit of Japanese-Americans, and the uncertainty of the 
future of the dependents of the volunteers. Once again, volunteers 
and their families were threatened. 
By March 3 only 58 Nisei had volunteered, and the disappointed 
Army team turned the recruiting over to the project administration. 
The Topaz evacuees then set up a Volunteers for Victory organization 
and adopted a patriotic creed that received favorable recognition 
nationally: 
We believe in democracy and dedicate ourselves to the furtherance 
of its principles. To uphold these principles, we must destroy every 
form of tyranny, oppression, and violation of human rights. We place 
our faith in America and base our hope in the future on that faith. There-
fore, we believe that our volunteering in the armed forces of this country 
is a step towards the realization of these ends, and a positive manifesta-
tion of our loyalty to the United States of America. 
A public campaign was staged, rallies were held, and booklets dis-
tributed. The Community Council was induced to cooperate to the 
extent of urging young men to be aware of their war duty. The result 
of the campaign was that opposition to Army service became negligible 
and there were 112 volunteers - 7 percent of those eligible - of whom 
80 passed the physical examinations and other tests and were accepted 
for service. All of these received regular soldier pay and their wives 
and children received full dependency pay.'" 
One event that occurred during the Topaz registration campaign 
served to weaken the evacuee faith in WRA. In October 1942 the 
Western Defense Command had decreed that no noncitizen Japanese 
Were to be allowed within a distance of one mile of the outside 
boundaries of the center. An inevitable result of this ruling was the 
~tal s~ooting, on April 11, 1943, of an elderly Issei resident (James 
atsukl Wakasa) by an MP sentry, who gave as explanation that Mr. 
Wakasa was attempting to cross the inner boundary fence and failed 
to obey the challenge to halt. There was a general clamor for pro-
~ection against soldiers with guns, a moving memorial service was 
eld for the victim, and there were work stoppages that lasted for two 
weeks until the administration promised that no incident of this kind 
~ould reoccur." All of the guards but one were later removed to 
e outer fence. Nevertheless, the morale of the camp suffered for 
---u-
Japanes';here were at various t imes recruiters for the WAC in Topaz and 116 WACs of 
Topaz. ancestry served during the war, but it seems doubtful that any of these were from 
held ':h~hehissentrr was arrested and underwent a court-martial trial at Fort Douglas, which 
action was completely justified under the orders he had received. 
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mo!e than a year as the result of this unfortunate episode. There was 
a "blow-up" at the hospital, a strike in the garage repair shop, a 
plumbing crew sit-down, complaints about the qU;llity of food, and 
other incidents of a like character which reflected the widespread 
lack of trust in the camp administration. 
The principal consequence of the mass registration was the segre-
gation of the "loyals" from the "disloyals." The project director had 
recommended that the actively discordant and openly pro-Fascist ele-
ments in the camp be separated from the others. (Indeed, he had 
gone even farther and recommended that the older Issei be separated 
from the younger Nisei, but this further step was not permitted by 
WRA.) Tule Lake, which had the largest proportion of the potential 
segregants already in residence, was chosen as the segregation center, 
and 1,447 residents of Topaz were moved there in September and 
October 1943. In exchange, 1,489 residents of Tule Lake who had 
declared their loyalty to the United States were moved to Topaz. Of 
the Topazans transferred to Tule Lake, 859 had asked for repatriation 
or expatriation, 259 had answered "no" to the loyalty question, 325 
were voluntarily accompanying relatives, and 4 were unspecified. 
Some 385 of the Topaz segregants were Japanese aliens and 1,062 were 
American citizens.'· 
EVACUEE EMPLOYMENT AND 
COMPENSATION 
M ilton Eisenhower's emphasis on providing suitable work pro-jects was based on the pressing need for skilled manpower, 
the need to keep the evacuees busy and maintain their connections 
with the American scene, and the need for the Japanese to prove, by 
constructive deeds, that they were loyal Americans. 
The inducements which WRA could provide for its work projects, 
however, were sharply limited by political pressures and public opin-
ion. Indeed, the national director was compelled to assure Congress 
that the maximum rate of pay for evacuees working on public projects 
would not under any circumstances exceed the minimum rate of pay 
of the American private fighting his country's battles overseas. At the 
time of the evacuation this was $21 a month. When Congress raised 
the soldier's minimum pay from $21 to $50, WRA did not see fit to 
increase its own pay scale, for it had by this time determined to make 
relocation its most important objective and was inclined to reject any 
change which might keep the residents tied to the centers. 
After considering a plan for the inauguration of profit-making 
enterprises at the centers, WRA found it ultimately necessary to 
~any of the Topaz renunciants who expressed a desire to go voluntarily to Japan were 
ultimately sent on exchange ships. . 
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institute a program of straight compensation for work actually per-
formed under WRA direction. Unskilled labor and persons taking 
vocational training were paid $12 a month; skilled labor and the more 
responsible clerical and community service jobs, $16 a month; and 
highly-skilled, highly-responsible, and professional employees, $19 a 
month. Food, shelter, medical care, and education were furnished 
without charge to all evacuees except those who were temporarily 
{;mployed outside the centers. 
The policy also provided for cash allowances at rates varying 
from $2.25 for children to $3.75 a month for persons over 16 to cover 
costs of clothing for each employed evacuee and each of his depen-
dents. WRA also was able to obtain G.l. clothes left over from World 
War I to distribute to the workmen. Monthly unemployment compen-
sation payments of $3.25 for each adult, $2.75 for a wife, and $1.50 for 
a child were made to each employable evacuee (and dependents) who 
was out of work through no fault of his own. to Evacuees working 
for prevailing wages in seasonal and short-term employment outside 
the centers received only the standard center rates and the balance 
paid by the employer was deposited in a trust fund to be administered 
for the benefit of the whole community. 
Within a week after the arrival of the 8,000 residents at Topaz, 
2,827 persons (2,199 men, 628 women) were on the payroll under these 
stipulations. The breakdown in employment was as follows: 
Dining hall operations 1,023 
Maintenance and construction 634 
Project administration 284 
Employment placement & housing 166 
Health and sanitation 146 
Police department 132 
Transportation and supplies 
Community services and activities 
Agriculture 
Fire department 
Education 
132 
113 
106 
50 
41 
Of the total, 2,586, or 91 percent, were in the $16 group, and 241, or 9 
percent, in the $19 class. The latter included doctors, engineers, 
dentists, certified teachers, qualified social workers, fire captains, and 
editors. At the peak, in June 1943, some 3,300 persons were employed 
in the Topaz center - about 75 percent of the able-bodied . residents 
of working age. All the labor was voluntary, and a 44-hour work 
week was followed. This was at a time when the Caucasian carpenters 
working on the construction of the project, and other American citizens 
~erving in the camp administration or outside in equivalent positions 
m civilian jobs, were being paid from $150 to $250 per month. It is 
Surprising that there was not more envy and resentment at the grossly 
discriminatory treatment. 
-obI' '~ l he provisions for unemployment compensation carried the implication that WRA was 
to ~a e to provide jobs for all able-bodied adult evacuee residents who expressed a desire 
do f rk. Unquestionably, for several months there was overstaffing, the creation of hoon-wh~g lng POSItions , and encouragement of slack working habits. In the late spring of 1943, 
the n Work opportunities for evacuees were developing in most sections of the country and 
OOlD resettlement program began moving into high gear. WRA eliminated unemployment 
to repollensahOO (except for evacuees who had actually been assigned to jobs and were unable 
rt for work because of illness), and tightened up on its employment procedures •. 
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The Topaz administrator reported that most of the workers took 
intense personal pride in their accomplishments and worked hard 
regardless of monetary rewards. Nevertheless, despite the Japanese 
reputation for energy and efficiency, these were not always carried 
over into the economically-constricted environment of the center. One 
factor, of course, was the conflict in objectives. On the one hand, 
WRA strove for the greatest possible economy, efficiency, and com-
munity service; on the other hand, it encouraged the most energetic, 
most skillful, and best adjusted evacuees to leave the centers and 
resettle in ordinary American communities. At Topaz, such conflicts 
were almost invariably resolved in favor of relocation. 
COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT 
WRA intended from the beginning that evacuees should play an active and influential part in shaping community life in 
the various centers. Some form of democratic self-government was 
essential, not only as a matter of human decency, but as the most 
practical way of insuring cooperation and mutual understanding be-
tween administrators and administered. Above all, WRA was deter-
mined that life within the centers should be as far from the concentra-
tion camp pattern as possible. For most of the residents it was not 
only the first all-Japanese city in which they had lived, but also the 
first experience for them in running, even in a limited way, their own 
city and government. 
The basic unit for political action in Topaz was the residential 
block, whose 250 to 300 people had more or less common interests, 
close associations, and a feeling of unity. In charge of each block was 
a salaried manager ($16 a: month) appointed by the administration. His 
functions were to listen to complaints and see that the everyday 
physical needs of the residents were met as fully and promptly as 
possible; to supervise the general maintenance of the block's grclun<lS 111 
and structures; and to bring to the attention of the residents the 
announcements and regulations issued by the administration. 
of the block managers were Issei. 
The central governing body was the Community Council 
sisting of one elected representative from each residential block. 
councilmen were not paid, but each was given a full-time paid eXI'lCUI·. 
tive secretarv. The term of office was six months. Within the 
work of WR·A regulations and a locally-drafted constitution, the 
munity Council determined over-all policies and procedures, 
adopted and enforced ordinances and regulations in the interest 
community welfare and security. The Topaz Council, for 
dealt with labor relations, the hospital, food supplies, leave cle,arlllncc". 
segregation movements, enlistment in the Army, resettlement ~lijLIUJ"'e .. 
community ceremonies, and center liquidation. 
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The voting privilege was given to all residents 18 and over, and 
the holding of elective office was reshicted to those who were Ameri-
can citizens over 21. The latter. provision was incorporated because 
of the feeling that the citizenship of the Nisei was valueless unless it 
gave them this recognition, and also because the decisions taken by 
the Nisei would almost certainly be more in keeping with American 
institutions and practices. However, the Issei were eligible for ap-
pointive positions. Early in 1943, when many of the capable and 
reliable Nisei leaders began to leave the centers for relocation, the 
policy on community government was broadened to permit Issei mem-
bership on the Council. This change lessened the cleavage between 
the Issei and the Nisei and introduced a leaven of maturity and 
seasoned judgment into the Council. It also tended to place respon-
sibility in the hands of many who were critical of the basic resettle-
ment aims of WRA and less sensitive to the exacting demands of Amer-
ican public opinion. 
Despite the fact that the evacuee people were living in a highly-
abnormal, highly-charged atmosphere, there was less crime than in 
ordinary American communities of the same size." According to one 
survey made in 1944, the law was broken three times as frequently in 
ordinary cities as in relocation centers. In the Utah center, for ex-
ample, the worst crimes in three years of existence, with an average 
of almost 8,000 people, were 2 cases of aggravated assault, 2 of grand 
larceny, and 1 of destroying government property. There were no 
murders or rapes, only 6 cases of drunkenness, 10 of gambling, a 
number of cases of burglary and minor theft, and 272 parking 
violations.u 
AGRICULTURE 
r was the original objective of WRA that each center be as nearly 
self-sufficient as possible, that a surplus of certain products be 
produced to supply other centers where the production of such items 
~as insufficient, and that, where possible, additional supplies of food 
produced for the Food-for-Freedom program. This goal of self-
sufficiency was steadily revised downward as the emphasis of WRA's 
program shifted from detention to relocation. 
-ind IT. Utah's Justice James H. Wolfe, of the State Supreme Court, on the occasion of YoIh~lcting newly-elected councilmen at Topaz, remarked : "It is almost unbelievable that a 
to the . P10ple could be uprooted from their homes, from their bnsinesses, suffer interruption 
COmf ell amily life, come to an entirely strange place, in a place of isolation and many dis-
speak'rts, Uand yet for a period of over two years have no serious outbreak of disorder. It 
Illve sd We for your restraint, your patience, your courage, your citizenship. You have kept 
emocratic principles among yourselves:' Salt Lake Tribune, March 14, 1945 . 
• lon~ J:;,e chief of the internal security section did report one interesting difficulty: It took 
ics reas .:d to get police patrol cars repaired quickly in the motor pool. Apparently, mechan-
from tr.:'t ~at if the patrol car was in the motor pool, other cars and drivers were safe 
Pool Wi~'C !ickets. Reports indicate severnl instances in which cars were taken to the motor 
nunor repairs and held on one excuse or other for several weeks or months. 
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For purposes of agricultural production at Topaz the government 
had purchased 20,000 shares of water in the Abraham, Delta, and 
Deseret Canal companies, and thirteen farmsteads, comprising 18,840 
acres. Only 20 percent of the land was cultivated - mostly in alfalfa; 
the remainder was about half rangeland and half non-cropland. 
About 35 percent of the land had once been cultivated but had since 
been abandoned. The evacuees were able to bring an additional 5,000 
acres into production, including 1,020 acres which previously had 
been classified as non-cropland. The government also provided initial 
starts of 1,700 poults, 13,000 baby chicks, 200 brood sows and over 
2,000 other swine, and 1,800 head of beef. 
Despite the urban background of the residents - there were less 
than 250 farmers in the entire camp - the evacuees were able to pro-
duce more than $500,000 worth of agricultural products.1• These 
included: 
1,400,000 pounds of vegetables 
Contemporary value 
$ 33,000 
165,000 3,000,000 pounds of field crops - alfalfa and grain 
1,200 turkeys 6,500 
35,000 83,000 dozen eggs 
9,200 chickens 
3,000 hogs 
1,800 head of live beef 
Total 
9,500 
97,000 
165,000 
$511,000 
This production provided most of their vegetables, beef, and pork, 
about 75 percent of their eggs, and nearly all the feed needed for 
their livestock. Topaz also supplied 288 head of beef to the Minidoka 
Relocation Center. The agricultural supervisor had originally hoped 
to grow sugar beets but this plan was abandoned because most of the 
workers were needed outside the centers at harvest time. Many 
families planted victory gardens, and organized bucket brigades to 
take water from the laundries to the land, but these did not flourish, 
nor was the production of fruit practical. No agricultural program 
was planned for 1945 because of the imminent closing of the center; 
the land and water were cash-leased to eleven local farmers. All told, 
local production provided about 10 percent of the value of all food 
consumed in the center. 
The first and most important activity of the agricultural workers 
was to build fences, canals and ditches, corrals, swine sheds, and 
poultry houses. Throughout the life of the project it is estimated 
that more than half of the time of agricultural workers was devoted 
to such construction work. Much additional time was required in mak-
ing and repairing agricultural equipment. Not until the close of 
--"--WRA policies prohibited the establishment of dairies at the centers. Reasons for this 
were the lack of experience on the p art of the evacuees, the indefin ite period of center occupa-
tion, and the difficulty of complying with state and local sanitary regulations. 
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1944 could the agricultural supervisor say that the farm was relatively 
well-equipped and the enterprises well-organized, but then it was near 
time to close the camp. 
As the Mormon pioneers had found out before them, the climate 
proved to be particularly hazardous. In 1943 a frost on June 4 killed 
many of the newly-planted vegetables. The next year, the last spring 
frost was May 4, but the first killing frost in the fall was September 16, 
and this destroyed many of the tomatoes, peppers, eggplants, cucum-
bers, cantaloupes, and squash. The cool evening breezes of the sum-
mer were pleasant for the residents but kept plants from growing 
rapidly, and often the wind blew hard with damage to some of the 
crops. Meanwhile, the flaming skies of summer baked the soil, and 
a good stand of carrots was virtually impossible. In the spring of 
1944, it stormed 59 days between January and June, delaying much 
of the field work. Irrigation also proved to be a problem. The quality 
of the soil was such that, either the farmers irrigated too much and 
had poor drainage, or irrigated too little with insufficient moisture 
for growth.'" Nevertheless, their vegetables won many prizes at the 
Millard County Fair, and at the annual harvest festival in September 
1944, representatives of the Utah State Agricultural College «expressed 
amazement at the food produced on the project's submarginal land." 
Other problems were related to the location of the farming lands. 
The residential area was three miles from the poultry houses, five 
miles from the swine ranch and vegetable lands, and six miles from 
the beef headquarters. Much time was wasted walking back and forth 
or waiting for a single truck to carry workers to and from the camp. 
Added to this was the military police requirement that Caucasian 
escorts must accompany all persons going to the farms. It was not 
until the spring of 1944, a year and a half after the camp was settled, 
that administrators got clearance to establish a central field kitchen 
with lunches and dinners for the workers. 
INDUSTRY AND TRADE 
As with agriculture, the early staff members of WRA intended 
the centers to enter heavily into the production of industrial 
goods, but found this goal conflicted sharply with the early decision 
to make relocation outside the centers the first order of business. 
During the early months WRA explored a wide range of potential 
~~~ufacturing enterprises for the centers, including the possibility of 
a mg contracts to produce camouflage nets, cartridge belts, tents, 
~nd optical lenses. All were items needed by the Armed Forces, 
Involved much labor with skills the Japanese had an aptitude for, and 
~ killed b The ag.riculhrral supervisor somewhat jokingly reported that half of the alfalfa was 
Y over-lITigation and the other half by under-irrigation I 
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were the kind of industries that would provide an opportunity for 
them to show their loyalty. The problem in all of these boiled down 
to the matter of pay - how could the evacuees be paid an incentive 
wage which would not upset the standard pay scale adopted for the 
work in the centers? After some experience with privately-operated 
factories in some of the centers, WRA issued a directive stipulating 
that all industries must be operated as WRA projects; the establish-
ment of evacuee-sponsored production enterprises was prohibited. It 
was also specified that all industrial workers would be paid at the 
standard WRA rates. 
Most enterprises actually established were designed to meet the 
needs of community management or of individual center residents, 
rather than to produce goods for other centers or the outside market. 
Thus, the principal Utah enterprise was the furniture factory, which 
turned out furniture for community buildings. An adobe brick unit 
made tens of thousands of bricks, and a sheet metal manufacturing 
unit made roof jacks. Topaz also had an ice cream freezer, a bean 
sprout plant which produced $7,000 worth of bean sprouts, and a soy-
bean cake and milk plant which produced $25,000 worth of tofu. 
As with industrial enterprises, WRA found · it necessary to forbid 
the establishment of retail shops and services by individuals and in-
sisted that they be on a consumer cooperative basis. . WRA set up 
standards of organization and membership participation, and laid 
down general instructions on merchandising, pricing, the distribution 
of dividends, and auditing. Some direction and control by the admin-
istrator were necessary because a few of the residents felt that the 
cooperative stood in the way of getting more free services from the 
government." 
With a membership of more than 5,000, the Topaz Consumer C0-
operative Enterprises, Inc., operated a network of individual enter-
prises, ranging from single-employee watch repair shops to moderate-
sized department stores stocking a wide variety of merchandise and 
employing many dozens of persons. Its branches included four can-
teens or general stores handling drugs, tobacco, hardware, food, and 
soft drinks at various barracks within the camp; and, in addition, a dry 
goods store, shoe and clothing store, fish market, bank, barbershoP, 
beauty parlor, photo studio, two movie theaters, three laundry and dry 
cleaning establishments, shoe and electrical repair shops, optical shop, 
and mail order service. Employment and work experience were pro-
vided for more than 500 residents. Gross sales averaged in excess of 
$40,000 per month, sufficient to enable the cooperative to reimburse 
'iVRA for all salaries and allowances paid to employees, and to pay rent 
for the WRA building space and equipment. Nor was it necessary 
--;;;--Some of the older residents suggested that the Topaz cooperative bankrupt itself 
selling below cost ""d thus force the government to assume a greater responsibility for 
welfare of the residents I 
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Ir WRA to extend the cooperative credit since it successfully negotiated 
n a number of loans from the Bank of Nephi. 
e An audit of its books for September 1944 showed total assets of 
e about $150,000, of which members' equities amounted to $85,000. Fix-
d ed assets were only $10,000, but there was a merchandise inventory of 
g $50,000, and cash in a bank in Nephi amounting to $70,000. The co-
l- operative held monthly meetings, published a weekly bulletin, and 
[t achieved representative management by having 34 block assemblies of 
e 24 members each, a cooperative congress of 60 members, and a board 
of directors of 15 members. All profits, of course, were distributed 
e among the evacuee customers.'" 
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MESS OPERATIONS 
Prom a perusal of letters to editors and the speeches of congressmen during the war it is apparent that a large number of people came 
to believe that practically all of the food problems and shortages of 
nearby areas were caused by WRA "pan1pering" of evacuees. These 
fears were partly the result of unfounded rumor and partly of deliber-
ate misrepresentation. WRA policy was that the evacuees were en-
titled to the same treatment as other American citizens and residents 
of non-Japanese descent - no more, no less. 
The project director at Topaz aimed at a diet which would cost less 
than "reduced" Army rations; i. e., menus based on a ration costing 42 
cents per person per day. "Fancy grades" of food were specifically 
prohibited, but special diets, as prescribed by the medical staff, were 
permitted for pregnant and nursing women. In the case of food which 
was rationed to the whole American people, this was to be made avail-
able to Topazans in the same ratio as to the general public. One of 
the problems was to please both the Issei, who wanted Japanese-style 
meals, and the Nisei who demanded American-style. 
The food in each of the thirty-four dining halls was served cafete-
ria style; family-style eating was tried, but proved to be unsatisfactory. 
When a person was ill, members of his family were pennitted to take 
food to his room. There were two meatless meals per week, fish was 
aVailable two meals per week, fowl was served on Sundays, rice was 
cooked every day, and records indicate that there was lots of stew. 
ReSidents were pennitted only one cup of coffee and two cups of tea 
per day. Milk was restricted to children, invalids, and the aged. 
Throughout most of the period, staples not produced in the center 
Were obtained from the Utah General Depot in Ogden; vegetables, 
eggs, cheese, and poultry from the Quartennaster Market Center in 
-:s-
evacUe Mt~r . the first year of tense guard, "block shopping" was introduced whereby an 
residen'i.. ~IShing to make a trip to Delta would obtain special permission to shop for other 
returrung 'tn tthhe block. There was, of course, strict military inspection of those leaving and 
o e center. 
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Salt Lake City; meat from the Quartermaster Market Center in Den-
ver; and fish from the Quartermaster Market Center in Los Angeles. 
Most of the perishables came from Salt Lake or California; milk was 
purchased in Millard, Weber, and Salt Lake Counties. 
OTHER PHASES OF CENTER ACTIVITY 
Perhaps the most significant activity of the center, in terms of long-range goals, was education. Almost 3,000 students passed through 
the Topaz school system, and more than 1,000 eventually emerged as 
high school graduates. The center school system was accredited by 
the Utah State Board of Education, and the pupils were able to trans-
fer without loss of credit to schools outside the center. The full and 
varied curriculum included agriculture, art, mechanic arts, and com-
merce, as well as the traditional "core." Four pre-school nurseries had 
an average enrollment of 180, two elementary schools (Desert View 
and Mountain View) had an average enrollment of 675, and a combined 
junior-senior high school averaged more than 1,200 enrolled. There 
was an average of 90 fully~certified teachers, about half of whom were 
evacuees and half Caucasians. Evacuee teachers, of course, received 
the standard camp wages of $16 or $19 per month. With their straight-
backed benches and monitors, the buildings resembled those construct-
ed by Utah's pioneers, and the 2,000 students took their turns at stoking 
the smoky coal stoves. 
An even larger proportion of the camp was served by the 150 
classes in adult education. More than 3,000 residents were enrolled in 
Americanization and such other classes as civics, basic English, auto 
mechanics, carpentry, radio repair, music, art, sewing, and flower ar-
rangement.' Frequent ' lectures 'and art and hobby shows drew much 
interest. Topaz had the finest public library of all the centers, drawing 
an average weekly patronage of 2,500. It also had the most extensive 
collection of Japaneselanguage books and literature. 
Medical care was furnished without cost to all evacuees in a 128-
bed hospital which was directed by Caucasians, but staffed largely by 
evacuee doctors, dentists, and nurses. In general, despite the crowded 
living conditions and community kitchen, the, health record was com-
parable with that in normal communities of similar size. There was aD 
influenza epidemic in the winter of 1943-1944, when more than 1,100 
patients were treated, but there were no deaths on this or any other 
occasion from communicable diseases. There was, however, a high 
incidence of peptic ulcers, attributed to the extreme nervous f'PT,"UJU fll l 
and frustrated and unsettled state of evacuee minds. 
Welfare services were provided for residents without 
means of support, for the physically handicapped, and for 
children. Particular problems were the "prisoner" frame 
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characterized by an absence of self-reliance, and family counseling. 
Many families were divided, with the parents wanting to apply for re-
patriation to Japan, and the children wanting no part of Japan. Where 
the children found it in their consciences to disobey their parents, there 
were guilt feelings, and their minds were often in a state of torment. 
The parents, on the other hand, repudiated by their children, were 
equally disturbed. 
Improbable as it might seem, the Pahvant encampment was the 
headquarters of the Buddhist Church in America during the war - its 
headquarters having been transferred to Topaz from San Francisco. 
Comprising 40 percent of the residents, the Buddhists joined with the 
Christians, who represented another 40 percent, to form an inter-faith 
council. It was said to be the only merging of these two faiths in the 
world. In addition to two Buddhist and four Protestant "churches," 
with separate services in English and Japanese, there was also a 
"church" shared by the Seventh Day Adventists and the Roman Catho-
lics. The administration permitted complete freedom of religious wor-
ship except for the practice of State Shinto, the one sect which in-
volved worship of the Emperor and provided the doctrinal justification 
for Japan's aggressive expansion. 
All of the centers had community newspapers published in both 
English and Japanese. The mimeographed Topaz Times was produced 
by evacuee staffs with a minimum of supervision and no overt exercise 
of censorship. 
The community activities program, embracing the recreational, 
athletic, and other organized leisure-time activities of residents, was 
programmed purposefully to emphasize identification of the residents 
with the larger American community. By the summer of 1943 evac-
uees had completed and landscaped a golf course, baseball diamond, 
softball grounds, football field, and tennis and volley ball courts. Ath-
letic events were staged regularly, and Topaz school teams won many 
victories on the fields of Millard County. The American-style organ-
izations in Topaz included the YMCA, YWCA, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, 
4-H Clubs, Campfire Girls, usa, and various social clubs and organi-
zations. As with other American communities in wartime, there were 
scrap-paper, scrap-metal, and clothing drives, war bond sales, Red 
Cross drives, blood donations, and such other neighborhood and com-
munity projects as talent shows and summer theater. In many of these 
activities, particularly in the later stages of the war, Topaz was invited 
to join with Delta, Hinckley, and other neighboring towns. 
'. The recreation program became increasingly important and divers-
ifled in 1944 and 1945 as relocation was stepped-up and the production 
p~ogram declined. Residents went fishing, hunted arrowheads and ~llobites, practiced the traditional calligraphy, built rock gardens, 
eCOrated entrances of bare buildings with arches and hand-hewn stair-
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ways, polished stones, made artificial flowers and flower arrangements, 
embroidered and made dolls and doll clothing. Two evacuee walking 
companions found the Drum Mountains meteorite, "about the size of 
a bag of potatoes" but weighing 1,500 pounds, which was the ninth 
largest meteorite found in the United States and the largest ever found 
in Utah. It was purchased by the Smithsonian Institution for $700. 
Other evacuees graced their lives during the long months of con-
finement by creating works of enduring beauty. One of the thriving 
industries of the last months was the manufacture of miniature shell 
jewelry - lapel ornaments, brooches, and necklaces. Of the most 
delicate workmanship, they were made of infinitesimal mussel and 
snail shells . which were harvested from the ancient bottom of Lake 
Bonneville. At times a mile-long stretch of toilers could be seen at 
dawn making its way to the desert location where the best of these 
shells were found. Patient ·workers sifted the sands for the tiny shells 
much as placer miners searched for gold in California. Preserved in 
the alkali soil for thousands of years, they were washed, bleached, 
sorted, and tinted before being made into delicate ornaments of extra-
ordinary beauty. 
THE STRUGGLE FOR STATUS 
When the evacuees moved into Topaz in 1942, they had reached the lowest status ever experienced by a comparable group . of Ameri-
cans. , They had been forcibly removed from their homes, herded into 
the nearest approximation to a concentration camp America has ever 
had, and prohibited from moving about or engaging in the occupational 
pursuits of their choice. They were not even permitted to join the 
Army and fight for their country. 
To counteract the suspicion, uneasiness, and unreasoning prejudice 
which had produced this state of affairs, WRA sought to give oth~ 
Americans the opportunity of observing and mingling with Nisei in the 
ordinary pursuits of life, and to offer the Nisei the opportunity of serv~ 
ing in the Armed Forces. 
The student relocatees, of whom there were 105 from Topaz study-
ing in 43 different colleges and universities, were particularly effective 
in reminding Americans of the plight of the Nisei. Articulate and 
thoroughly Americanized, they made good impressions wherever they 
went, and the reports they sent back to the centers indicated their 
treatment was far different from .that to which they had been o""'I1lI"" . 
tomed on the Coast. One girl wrote of finding the head of the SClll()Ol'1I 
waiting in the rain for her when she reached the station at three 
in the morning. Another mentioned that she and the other J 
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students were guests at a special welcome dinner given by the college 
president and his wife."" The instructions given to the students by a 
Topaz advisor were one reason for their effective "missionary" work: 
It won't do you or your family and friends much good to dwell on what 
you consider injustices when you are questioned about evacuation. Rather, 
stress the contributions of these people to the nation's war effort. Mention 
the great number of Nisei in the United States Army, the way the Man-
zanar Boy Scouts protected the American flag from a pro-Axis mob, how 
the evacuees are engaging in wartime agriculture, and you will do the Jap-
anese in this country more good than talking about discrimination." 
More spectacular were the achievements of two Japanese-Ameri-
can troop units. The first of these, the 100th Infantry Battalion, was 
composed mainly of Nisei volunteers from Hawaii. A leading partici-
pant in the slow, bloody march up the peninsula of Italy, the 100th 
spent many months in the thick of combat, suffered 300 killed and 650 
wounded out of a total of 1,000 men, and won the praises of practically 
all officers and men associated with it. It was followed by the 442 
Regimental Combat Team which had been · formed in 1943 from the 
volunteers from Topaz and other relocation centers and from Hawaii. 
All observers classed the performance of this "Go for broke" unit as 
herOic, ranking with the best in the European Theater. With a nor-
mal complement of around 5,000, it suffered a total of 4,430 casualties 
(including 569 killed in action), and received so many unit and individ-
ual citations and awards that it is often referred to as "the most deco-
rated unit in United States military history:"" 
By January 20, 1944, the War Department was so deeply impressed 
with the spirit and determination of these troops that it had decided 
to begin recruiting Nisei for the Army through regular Selective Ser-
vice procedures. This news was favorably received at the Utah center, 
because it indicated national approval of the fighting heroism of the 
Japanese-American combat team and because it represented a signifi-
cant step forward in the restoration of their rights as American citizens. 
By that time Topaz had 400 service stars representing that many young 
men who had volunteered for service. The Topaz Community Coun-
cil endorsed the draft, a local branch of the County Selective Service 
Board was opened, and the first group of 25 Topaz draftees reported 
at Fort Douglas on March 1 for pre-induction physical examinations. 
All told, 451 residents of Topaz were in the Armed Services, including 
the "original" 80 volunteers. Fifteen were killed in action and many 
Were wounded. 
~aro Katayama. "Beyond the gate." Trek, F ebruary 1943, p. 11. 
k Lillian ata, "Campus report." Trek, February 1943, p. 34. 
off 20 The commander of the 36th division, whose "Lost Battalion" of Texans had been cut 
IOldbYI German advance and was rescued by the 442nd, said : "No finer fighting, no finer 
ler y qualities have ever been witnessed by the U.S. Army in its long history." 
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THE RELOCATION MOVEMENT 
A lthough Topaz administrators had set forth relocation as their main objective soon after the camp was established, the actual move-
ment of evacuees out of the center to take up residence in normal com-
munities did not take on significant proportions until the spring of 1943. 
One ;reason for this was that each application for indefinite leave had 
been processed elaborately, leisurely, and individually, both in Topaz 
and in the WRA office in Washington, D. C. By March 1943, only 461 
evacuees had left Topaz, of which 9 were in the Armed Services, 49 
on educational leave, 173 on general "permanent" leave, and 230 on 
short-term and seasonal agricultural leave. 
To speed up the movement out of the center WRA authorized the 
Topaz director to issue permits for relocation in certain communities 
regardless of whether the applicant had a specific job prospect, and in 
advance of leave clearance. In addition, several limited and carefully-
controlled forms of financial assistance were granted. Transportation 
was provided from Topaz to the point of relocation, grants of $3.00 per 
day were made to cover cost of subsistence while traveling, and $25.00 
in cash was given to each needy evacuee to tide him over the period 
he was getting settled. As the result of these measures, adopteil in the 
spring of 1943, 887 evacuees had left Topaz by July to establish resi-
dence outside, and another 412 were on seasonal leave. Nearly all of 
the latter, and some of the former, were employed in Utah on sugar 
beet, fruit, and livestock farms, and in canneries and meat-packing 
plants. 
The largest number on employment leave were in Utah County. 
When the $200 million steel plant was built at Geneva (1943), many 
farmers with small acreages left their crops, and those with larger 
farms found it difficult to compete in hiring Caucasian labor. Recog-
nizing the role Topaz could play in relieving the local manpower short-
age, camp officials established a supervised "branch" at Provo. With 
the assistance of the Farm Security Administration, a "tent city" was 
built to house 400 workers. (A simuarbranch was built in Ogden.) 
Shower rooms, laundry, day nursery, recreation hall, medical clinic, 
and other facilities were provided. Approximately 700 Topazans were 
employed during part or all of the summer in this area. . 
Early in October 1943, at the height of the harvest, five local 
"white" youths drove by the camp on at least three occasions, hurling I 
insults and rocks. On the third occasion, at an hour when most of the 
workers were in the community hall enjoying a social, some 15 to 18 
shots were fired into the lighted buildings. Three of the workers were I 
hit, though none seriously. The terrorized Nisei delayed going out to 
work for at least a day until firm pledges of protection were made by 
city and county officials. During the next night, armed guards were 
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stationed around the camp. At a hastily-called meeting of town and 
county leaders, resolutions were adopted requesting full enforcement 
of the law, punishment of the offending youths, "acceptance of the Jap-
anese situation in the spirit of American tolerance," and asking persons 
in the area to "discourage all displays of racial antagonism and discrim-
ination." The youths were subsequently apprehended, confessed, and 
given short jail sentences. 
In general, there was complete satisfaction with the work of the 
evacuees in Utah, and the communities in the state received them well. 
A typical comment from a Nisei girl in Salt Lake City reported that the 
people were "openly sympathetic," and that the "very friendly atmos-
phere" was "undoubtedly influenced by the Mormons." 
During 1943 and 1944 almost 2,000 evacuees left Topaz on "per-
manent" leave. They went to 98 different cities in 21 states. Four 
percent entered professional activity, 4 percent clerical, 14 percent 
agricultural, 24 percent joined the ranks of skilled and semi-skilled 
labor, and 32 percent went into the service trades. The most popular 
area of relocation nationally was Chicago, because it had millions of 
people, abundant employment opportunities, and a noticeable absence 
of anti-oriental feelings." 
Although many Topazans also settled in the Chicago area the 
local favorite was the Wasatch Front, where a small but reasonably 
well-established Japanese population had existed since before the war, 
:md where many voluntary evacuees had located. Additionally, the 
evacuees and relocation field officers were convinced that Mormons, 
perhaps because of their own turbulent history, were disposed to be 
tolerant of persecuted minorities." Many of the evacuees who went 
out on seasonal leave to beet fields during 1942 and 1943 eventually 
gravitated into Salt Lake City and found year-round jobs. Some 250 
residents of the various centers were also recruited to work at Utah's 
Tooele Ordnance Depot, and 150 from Topaz were sent to the Sioux 
Ordnance Depot at Sidney, Nebraska. All of these were instructed to 
take their families and become integral members of the communities. 
All together, within the first year of relocation, 1,700 Nisei from 
Topaz and other centers entered the mainstream of American life in 
Utah. During the entire period of exclusion (1942-1946), 5,641 evac-
uees relocated in Utah. Of these, 2,002 settled in Salt Lake City, 900 
--.-.--
go Eo' WRA directors reversed Horace Greeley's maxim and advised: "Go East, young man, ast." . 
ext 21. In August 1942, before the opening of tbe Topaz center and during the period when 
9P~lve. agricultural leaves were being granted, WRA asked the W estern Institute of Public 
In llllon In Los Angeles to make a public opinion survey in Utah on " the Japanese question." 
Ja a poll of 5 ,000 Utahans , 66 percent expressed approval of a policy permitting citizen-.p~anese to leave the relocation centers and accept outside employment. Only 18 percent Pe~o~d of alien-Japanese being permitted to work outside the ccnters. Of those who favored 
iJnmedl . ng Nisei to work outside the centers. only 52 percent favored having them in the 
late vicinity where the interview took place. 
Simi] Unfortunately, there is no way to compare this with the attitude elsewhere, since no 
the ar s.uryey was taken in other states. Various WRA administrators, however, expressed 
cOnVlction that the reception in Utah would be and was relatively friendly. 
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in Ogden, 351 in Brigham City, 278 in Clearfield, and 241 in Tooele. 
Considering the 2,210 who were living in Utah at the outbreak of the 
war, the relocatees hiked Utah's resident population of persons of Jap-
anese descent to 7,851. Many of these left the state in the years after 
the war as brighter employment opportunities developed elsewhere. 
By 1950 there were only 4,452 persons of Japanese ancestry in Utah. 
The 1960 census showed 4,371. 
Despite the various inducements and aids the center offered to 
relocatees, one of the administration's main problems was to persuade 
the evacuees to leave. By the end of January 1945, for example, only 
495 families, representing about a thousand persons, had been com-
pletely relocated from Topaz. Approximately two-thirds of those 
evacuated to Topaz appeared to be unwilling to try a new life in an-
other part of the country than their West Coast homeland. The Topaz 
Community Council, increasingly dominated by Issei "standpatters," 
was the focus of this resistance to relocation. While the council was 
not ultimately opposed to armed service recruitment or selective ser-
vice, it obdurately refused to encourage persons to leave the center for 
resettlement. The opposition was particularly strong among those 
middle-aged and elderly people who had always lived in the Bay area's 
"Little Tokyo." Those who were without capital and had never had 
experience in anything but small self-operated enterprises were ter-
rified at the mere thought of working out their problems in a new set-
tillg. They did not look forward to working as paid employees in an-
other man's business, nor did they want to establish their business in 
any other region than the West Coast. 
LIQUIDATION 
Three years after Pearl Harbor, on Sunday, December 17, 1944, while General MacArthur's troops were advancing on Mariila, 
the Western Defense Command lifted the mass exclusion order effec-
tive January 2, 1945." The following day, WRA announced its 
decision to close all the relocation centers within six to twelve months. 
At the same time WRA ordered the termination of all seasonal agri-
cultural leaves, the liquidation of farming operations at all centers 
except Colorado River and Gila River where winter vegetables were 
still in the ground, and the closing of all relocation center schools at 
the end of the spring term. 
The Topaz evacuees were obviously happy over being allowed 
to return to their former homes, but they were at the same tiJn8 
--"-If there w as any justification for the mass · expulsion and incarceration, it 
existed after June 1942, for when the Jap anese fl eet w as decisively defeated in 
of Midway the p ossibility of an invasion of H awaii or the United States w as eff"cti'vely 
inated. Thus, even before any of the evacuees came to Utah the reason for rpIO"'."- ,. 
h ad disappeared. The lifting of the order should h ave come at least two years earlier 
it did. 
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apprehensive. There was fear of violence and boycott on the West 
Coast, and of being unable to find employment and housing. Some 
of the residents said they would sit tight until WRA adopted a more 
liberal policy of relocation assistance, including long-term, low-interest 
loans to businessmen and farmers to re-establish themselves. Others 
declared they would remain until the war was over, insisting they had 
been evacuated for "the duration" plus six months. 
To resolve their own policy, the Topaz Community Council 
sponsored an all-center conference, held in Salt Lake City in Febru-
ary, with council representatives from all centers except Manzanar and 
Tule Lake. The conference ended with a plea for more extensive 
relocation assistance. Overlooking the deadening effects of the insti-
tutional life of the centers, and stressing the difficulties which would 
be confronted by the older Issei upon their return, the delegates 
raised serious questions as to the fundamental wisdom and morality 
of closing the centers. It was cruel of WRA, they declared, to force 
these people to return without substantial help. WRA took a firm 
stand, however, and quietly insisted that the centers would be closed. 
There were about 6,000 evacuees in Topaz at the time, and many 
meetings were held to explain WRA policy. An Army recruiting 
team interviewed the residents of questionable loyalty and recom-
mended 250 of them for individual exclusion orders or further investi-
gation and possible internment. All of the remainder were cleared, 
on January 20,1945, for free movement anywhere in the United States. 
Nevertheless, only 134 residents were relocated in January 1945, com-
pared to 126 in the same month of 1944 - and only 38 of the 134 
returned to California. There was a definite increase in the medical 
cases due to worry over the closing of the center. . 
Topaz officials, however, went doggedly ahead with their plans 
to close the center. The first reserved trains left for Chicago on May 
14, and others followed in a regular schedule. As a step in liquidating 
the agricultural section, bids were issued for leasing the surplus farm 
lands until such time as the center would close, and the surplus farm 
equipment was sold at an auction at which more than a hundred certi-
fied dealers were in attendance. The educational program was ended 
With commencement exercises in June, and the teachers were dis-
charged or transferred to other work. The classes in adult education 
and vocational training were terminated in July. 
One problem which concerned the administration was the ten-
dency for the evacuees to want to put off relocation until the last few 
days before closing. Since the war in Europe was about over, troops 
Were being redeployed to the Pacific, straining transportation facilities 
to the utmost. It was conceded that there was little likelihood WRA 
Would be able to commandeer the trains to transport the entire evacuee 
POpulation to their desired location in one grand last-minute rush. 
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To encourage moving, therefore, the national office announced in 
June that all centers except Tule Lake would be closed between 
October 15 and December 15, 1945. Each project director was in-
structed to establish weekly quotas for relocation in order to meet the 
goal of depopulation by the closing date. These quotas were to be 
filled, as far as possible, by volunteers; but if the quota could not be 
filled in this manner, the director was authorized to complete the lot 
by assignment. Those assigned a departure date were given the 
option of selecting the place where they wished to relocate. Indi-
viduals refusing to make a selection were to be given a rail ticket to 
the community from which they were originally evacuated. Those 
who refused to pack their belongings were to have their property 
packed for them, and they were to be escorted to the train - if neces-
sary, by the internal security police. This threat of physical force 
was regarded as the only feasible alternative to an indefinite extension 
of the entire center program. 
The scheduling notice was issued just two weeks before V-J day 
and was actually announced to the evacuees only a few days before 
that event. This fortunate timing (entirely unpremeditated I) broke 
down the last real vestiges of evacuee resistance to the schedules. 
Even the most rabid diehards were now convinced that a return to 
private life was inevitable. The first train carrying Topaz evacuees 
to the West Coast left Delta on August 15 - just five days after V-J 
day - and the final closing date was announced to be October 31. 
The speed of the evacuation now depended on the availability of 
housing. The Public Housing Authority operated under instructions 
to provide housing only for returning veterans, but WRA field offices 
were eventually able to arrange for some surplus Army facilities and 
trailers in the vicinity of Los Angeles and San Francisco. In addition, 
the Buddhist Church of Topaz directed an aggressive program of 
relocation and housing assistance for members of that faith. By Sep-
tember, the outward movement was in earnest. There was a break-
down in work morale, a letdown in productive work, and a lack of 
concern for maintaining center activities. In October the last meeting 
of the Community Council was held, the block managers' organiza-
tion was dissolved, and a farewell banquet was held in Delta. The 
last special train left on October 26, with 325 aboard. Five days later, 
the center closed on schedule with the project director '10cking" the 
gate behind the last busload of evacuees at 1 p.m. The final exod~ 
consisted of thirty-two persons, mostly evacuee families from Hawan 
who had to remain until sailing arrangements were completed . . 
Of the total of 9,408 evacuees relocated from Topaz during the 
period the wartime city existed, nearly 6,000 were relocated in 1945. 
and more than 4,000 after August 15. Only 44 percent returned to ~ 
'Vest Coast - 43 percent to California, and 1 percent to Oregon an 
Washington. 
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After the property at Topaz had been inventoried, cleared out of 
the barracks and mess halls, and disposed of or stored, the center was 
turned over to the government liquidating agency, on February 9, 
1946. The land eventually was sold by the Federal Land Bank of 
Berkeley (on behalf of the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation) for 
a dollar an acre. The buildings, appraised at $4.5 million, were taken 
to the Branch Agricultural College and other schools, or were pur-
chased at nominal prices by farmers for chicken coops and tool sheds. 
Other supplies and equipment were sold to the Utah State Agricultural 
College, elementary and secondary schools, and to businessmen and 
farmers throughout the state. All that remains today of Topaz is 
the smokestack of a laundry boiler and a few concrete foundations. 
Emptied of its hunlan components, Topaz has been reclaimed by the 
barrenness from which it emerged. 
AFTERMATH 
The reception given the returnees was mixed. Many of those who returned to California were deprived of their rural homes 
under an "escheat law" passed in 1943. The charge was that the pro-
perty had been purchased or leased by alien parents in the name of 
citizen children and that this practice was in violation of the law. 
The statute has since been repealed. In some areas (e.g., Ogden and 
Layton, Utah) local officials refused to issue business licenses to per-
Sons of Japanese ancestry. In all such cases where the refusals were 
contested, they were overruled by the courts. A number of labor 
unions declined to accept Japanese-Americans as union members. 
Happily, almost all such instances of discrimination were short-lived. 
In Utah, the reception given returnees was conditioned by the 
attitude of the dominant Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
A number of the evacuees had become members of the church during 
their residency at Topaz, and they were given special relocation 
assistance by a Church Newcomers Committee established for the pur-
POse early in 1945. While the chief authorities of the church (and most 
sub-authorities) taught and practiced tolerance, a few local leaders 
opposed relocation. In a town in the Upper Snake River Valley, where 
a number of Nisei and Issei families joined the large number already 
there, a member of the local "stake presidency" took the lead in 
organizing a group opposed to the sale of real estate to Japanese. 
~is group brought sufficient pressure to bear on real estate agents 
t at in some cases where the sale of property was in process the 
rnoney was refunded to the buyer. To counteract this form of dis-
~rirnination on the part of local leaders the general authorities of the 
1.·D.S. Church, on December 4, 1945, issued a policy statement pub-
.Isdh:d in the church-owned Deseret News decrying "these foolish pre-
)U Ices." 
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Reports coming to this office [the editorial said] declare that in out-
lying districts these Japanese-Americans find a lack of warmth that is not 
evident in the more urban communities. In some sections, protests have 
been registered against leasing land to Japanese or those of Japanese 
ancestry. From another section came the report that the ranchers needed 
labor this fall, and were willing to have Japanese labor imported, but 
they did not want the Japancse boys and girls attending the schools 
where their own children were students. 
The prejudices went even farther than that, however. In one commun-
ity efforts were being made to raise money necessary to buy more books 
for the library and much difficulty was being experienced in getting the 
necessary funds. Finally someone thought of going to two or three Japan-
ese families to solicit them for funds, and the response of these people was 
so generous that the solicitors decided there must be something crooked 
in it and reported the generous donations to the sheriff . ... 
Americans who are loyal are good Americans whether their ancestors 
came from Great Britain or Japan, the Scandinavian countries or Germany. 
Let us, therefore, endeavor to banish these foolish prejudices from our 
natures and let us attempt to see that all good and loyal Americans are 
treated as such. 
Today, twenty years after the evacuation, 60 percent of the per-
sons of Japanese ancestry in the continental United States live in Cali-
fornia, compared with 75 percent in 1942. Illinois, which had only a 
few hundred in 1942, has 15,000, and many other states in the East 
and Midwest show similar increases. The congested "Little Tokyos" 
have been dispersed, and the J ~panese people have shown a greater 
spirit of independence in moving out of their own circles. On the 
Coast there are still some segregated churches and communities with 
their own clubs and social life, but they are rare and becoming rarer. 
Persons of Japanese descent have found friendliness, hospitality, 
more freedom of occupation, and few hindrances to integration into 
the greater American community. There is little evidence of anti-
Japanese sentiment. 
Many "Japanese" today are grateful for the evacuation experience. 
By uprooting them from the West Coast, it paved the way for their 
residence and acceptance in the interior. Many lawyers, doctors, 
business executives, and university professors now attribute their rise 
out of "second-class citizenship," at least in part, to the forced reloca-
tion from California. Bitter and bewildering as it was, the evacuation 
h now sometimes referred to as a "blessing in disguise." 
Other Americans may also be grateful for the humility which this 
disturbing outgrowth of war hysteria has induced. There now seeJDS 
to be general acceptance of Franklin Roosevelt's memorable apho~ 
that "Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry. 
If the memory of this protracted and unnecessary mass incarceration 
can help us to ward off other such episodes, the physical and psycho-
logical sufferings and economic losses of our fellow citizens of Jap-
anese ancestry may not have been in vain. We may even have ful-
filled the hope of John Milton: 
Yea even that which mischief meant most harm 
Shall in the happy trial prove most glory. 
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Appendix 
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF THE CENTRAL UTAH 
RELOCATION CENTER 
Number of persons 
The residents of Topaz came from the following places: 
1. Initial shipments to Topaz 
Tanforan Assembly Center, San Bruno, California 
Santa Anita Assembly Center, Arcadia, California 
Fresno Assembly Center, Fresno, California 
Total 
2. Subsequent additions to the Center population 
Voluntary residents admitted to the Center 
Seasonal workers released from assembly centers 
Direct evacuation from Hawaii 
Transfers from Tule Lake and other relocation centers 
Births 
Parolees from Department of Justice internment camps 
From hospitals 
From penal institutions 
Total 
Grand total admitted to the Center 
The residents of Topaz were dispersed in the following manner: 
1. Departure on indefinite leave 
Educational leaves 
Armed Forces 
"Outside" employment 
Penal institutions 
Mental institutions 
Hospitals 
Left to join or accompany families 
Repatriated to Japan on September 2, 1943 
Interned by Department of Justice 
Total 
2. Tranferred to Tule Lake Segregation Center 
3. Transferred to other centers 
4. Deaths 
5. Transported to location of choice after exclusion order 
lifted on January 2, 1945 
Grand total dispersed from Center 
7,676 
577 
5 
8,258 
43 
115 
228 
2,069 
384 
76 
36 
3 
2,954 
105 
178 
2,283 
8 
13 
16 
714 
18 
85 
3,420 
1,491 
144 
139 
6,018 
11,212 
11,212 
The peak population of Topaz was reached April 1, 1943, when there were 
8,316 residents. The average evacuee population was as follows: 1942, 7,473 
persons; 1943,7,936 persons; 1944,6,812 persons; 1945 (until October 31), 4,784 
persons. 
3 The age distribution of Topaz, as of January 30, 1943, was: 0-2 years, 358; 
-4 years, 222; 5-6 years, 179; 7-12 years, 651; 13-15 years, 484; 16-18 years, 708: ~~-21 years, 779; 22-25 years, 781; 26-30 years, 779; 31-35 years, 358; 41-45 years, 
.~2; 46-50 years, 475; 51-55 years, 549; 56-60 years, 499; 61-65 years, 352; 66-70 
Years, 195; 86-90 years, 1. 
Source : Compiled from War Relocation Authority, The Evacuated People: ~ Quantitative Description (Washington, 1946), Tables 3, 4, and 8, and from 
Opaz Times, January 30, 1943. 
-43-
-----
NOTE ON THE SOURCES 
Books and Documents 
The best single source on the evacuation of Japanese-Americans during World 
War II is WRA: A story at human conservation, Washington, D. C., 1946. Writ-
ten by staff members of the War Relocation Authority, this is a brief but compre-
hensive and interpretive history of the activities of WRA. In giving the back-
ground of WRA activities, I have borrowed from it freely and copiously, even to 
the extent of using some of its pluasing. Also published by WRA in 1946 are 
the following studies which treat particular phases of its activities in greater detail: 
Administrative highlights of the WRA program 
Community government in war relocation centers 
The evacuated peoples: A quantitative description 
Impounded people - Story of life in the relocation centers 
Legal and constitutional phases of the WRA program 
The relocation program 
Token shipments: The story of America's war refugee shelter 
Wartime exile- The exclusion of ,the Japanese Americans from the Well 
Coast 
Wartime handling of evacuee property 
People in motion: The postwar adiustment at the evacuated Japanese AmerI-
cans. 
The Army's role in the evacuation movement is described in 'Final Report. Ja~ 
ese evacuation from the West Coast, of the Western Defense Command, Washing-
ton, 1943. The evacuation is also reported in National defense migration, 77th 
Congress 2nd session, Report of the Select Committee investigating National De-
fense Migration, House Heport 1911, Washington, 1942; and National defefIIB 
migration, 77th Congress, 2nd session, House Report 2124, Washington, 1942. 
Outstanding studies of the national movement include: 
Bloom, Leonard, and Ruth Riemer. Removal and return: The socia-economic 
effects of the war on Japanese-Americans. Berkeley, University of California 
hess, 1949. 
Eaton, Allen H. Beauty behind barbed wire: The arts of the Japanese in our fJ)(It 
relocation camps. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1952. 
Grodzins, Mortin. Americans betrayed: 'Politics and the Japanese evacuatiOfl. 
Chicago, nl., The University ot Chlcago Press, 1949. 
Leighton, Alexander H. The governing of men: General principles and recommi1fl'" 
daUons based on experience at a japanese relocation camp. Princeton, N. J., 
Princeton University Press, 1945. 
Lind, Andrew W. Hawaii's Japanese. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University PreSSt 
1946. 
McWilliams, Carey. Preiudice - Japanese-Americans: Symbol at racial intoler-
ance. Boston, Mass., Little, Brown and Company, 1944. 
Smith, Bradford. Americans from Japan. Philadelphia, Pa., Lippincott, 1948. 
The University of California Press has published three studies under the geo-
eral title Japanese American evacuation and resettlement. 
Thomas, Dorothy S., and Richard S. Nishimoto. The spoilage. 1926. 
Thomas, Dorothy, S., Charles Kil.;uchi, and James Sakoda. The salvage. 1952-
tenBroek, Jacobus, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd Matson. ,Prejudice, war, (IftIl 
the constitution. 1958. 
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A complete documentary record of the activities of WRA is found in the Na-
tional Archives and in the University of California Library at Berkeley. The lat-
ter, which was used by the writer, includes general manuscript histories of the 
various divisions, reports, center newspapers and magazines, scrapbooks, and other 
material from the general office of WRA and from each of the ten relocation cen-
ters. The material at Berkeley is catalogued in Japanese American evacuation and 
resettlement: Catalog of material in the General Library, by Edward N. Barnhart, 
published by the University of California Press in 1958. Some personal papers 
(diaries, letters, etc.) are catalogued but are not available to the researcher. 
Other material which specifically bears on the Central Utah Relocation Cen-
ter at Topaz includes: 
Hardy, Douglas W. "Caucasian attitudes toward Japanese in metropolitan Salt 
Lake City." Salt Lake City, University of Utah, M. A. thesis. 1947. 
Okubo, Mine'. Citizen 13660. New York, Columbia University Press, 1946. 
Peterson, Erma, and Callie O. Morley. "History of Topaz" in Milestones of Mil-
lard: A centur~ of history of Millard County, 1851-1951, by Daughters of Utah 
Pioneers of Millard County. Springville, Utah, Art City Publishing Company, 
1951. pp. 610-619. 
Smith, Elmer R. "Japanese relocation study of Utah" (preliminary report) Uni-
versity of California Library, April 1944. (mimeo.) Berkeley. 
"Welcome to Topaz." Topaz, Utah, September, 1943. (mimeo. ) (in possession 
of the writer.) 
Periodicals and Newspapers 
A complete set of the Topaz Times (September 17, 1942 - August 31, 1945) 
is available in the University of California Library at Berkeley, as are the three 
numbers of Trek, an art and literary magazine published by the Topaz evacuees. 
Articles from these publications, as well as from the Deseret News and Salt Lake 
Tribune (Salt Lake City) and Millard County Chronicle (Delta), have been used 
extensively in preparing this lecture. Many articles have been published in 
national magazines dealing with the subject. Among the most useful have been: 
Ballif, Ariel S. "Reactions to laborers from relocation centers," Sociology and 
Social Research 29: 40-45. September-October 1944. 
Barnhart, Edward N. "The individual exclusion of Japanese Americans in World 
War II." Pacific Historical Review 229: 111-130. May 1960. 
"Belated justice." Christian Century, September 28, 1949, p. 1128. 
"Disguised blessing." Newsweek 52: 23. December 29, 1958. 
F'isher, Galen M. "Japanese colony: Success story." Survey Graphic 32: 41-43. 
February 1943. 
"Issei, Nisei, Kibei." Fortune 29: 8 ff. April 1944. 
Iwata, Masakazu. "The Japanese immigrants in California agriculture." Agri-
cultural History 36: 25-37. January 1962. 
McEvoy, J,M. "Our 110,000 new boarders." Readers Digest 42: 65-68. March 
1943. 
The Pacific Citizen, various issues. Published weekly in Salt Lake City and Los 
Angeles by the Japanese American Citizens' League. 
Rostow, Eugene V. "Our worst wartime mistake." Harper's Magazine 191: 
193-201. September 1945. 
Smith, Elmer R. "The 'Japanese' in Utah." Utah Humanities Review 2: 129-
144, 208-230. April, July 1948. 
Ta~, .Henry. "The Nisei since Pearl Harbor." The Pacific Spectator 1: 203-213. 
PIIng 1947. 
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TWENTY-FIFTH FACULTY HONOR LECTURE 
DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY 
APRIL 26, 1962 
A basic objective of the Faculty Association of the Utah State Uni-
versity, in the words of its constitution, is 
To encourage intellectual growth and development of its members by 
sponsoring and arranging for the publication of two annual faculty 
lectures in the fields of (a) the biological and exact sciences, including 
engineering, called the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the Natural 
Sciences; and (b) the humanities and social ' sciences, including education 
and business administration, called the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in 
the Humanities. 
The administration of the University is sympathetic with these 
aims and shares the cost of publishing and distributing these lectures. 
Lecturers are chosen by a standing committee of the Faculty 
Association. Among the factors considered by the committee in 
choosing lecturers are, in the .words of the constitution: 
( 1) creative activity in the field of the proposed lecture; (2) publication 
of research through recognized channels in the fields of the proposed 
lecture; (3) outstanding teaching over an extended period of years; (4) 
personal influence. in developing the characters of students. 
Dr. Arrington was selected by the. committee to deliver the Fac-
ulty Honor Lecture in the Humanities. On behalf of the members of 
the Association w~ are happy to present this paper: THE PRICE OF 
PREJUDICE: THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELOCATION CEN-
TER IN UTAH DURING WORLD WAR II. 
COMMITTEE -ON FACULTY HONOR LECTURE 
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